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CIVIL RIGHTS LAW IN LIVING COLOR
VINAY HARPALANI ∗
ABSTRACT
This Article will examine how American civil rights law has
treated “color” discrimination and differentiated it from “race”
discrimination. It is a comprehensive analysis of the changing legal meaning of “color” discrimination throughout American history. The Article will cover views of “color” in the antebellum era,
Reconstruction laws, early equal protection cases, the U.S. Census, modern civil rights statutes, and in People v. Bridgeforth—a
landmark 2016 ruling by the New York Court of Appeals. First,
the Article will lay out the complex relationship between race and
color and discuss the phenomenon of colorism—oppression based
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on skin color—as differentiated from racism. It then will analyze
“color” in Reconstruction Era anti-discrimination laws, examining how both “race” and “color” came to be included in these
laws. It will illustrate that under early equal protection cases, prohibitions on “race” and “color” discrimination both aimed to curb
racism. “Race” and “color” were equally important, but under
the Fourteenth Amendment, “color” discrimination never developed any meaning independent of “race” discrimination. The Article will show how “color” began disappearing from equal protection jurisprudence, just as civil rights efforts to address race
discrimination became successful. It will then discuss how
“color” reemerged in cases involving modern civil rights statutes
and how these cases define “color” discrimination differently, focusing on colorism rather than racism. Additionally, color discrimination claims under these statutes have only applied to an individual member of one racial subclass, such as a dark-skinned
Black plaintiff. However, in Bridgeforth, the Court of Appeals recognized a multiracial color class, composed of a group of darkskinned individuals of different races, for equal protection-based
Batson challenges to juror exclusion. Bridgeforth was the first
case to allow Batson challenges for color discrimination, and the
first color discrimination case under any law to recognize a multiracial color class. This Article will consider the potential of multiracial color classes for the future of civil rights law.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2016, the New York Court of Appeals issued a landmark
civil rights ruling. With its decision in People v. Bridgeforth, 1 the Court of
Appeals held that skin color discrimination is cognizable for Batson v. Kentucky 2 challenges to juror exclusion. 3 Batson challenges derive from the

1. 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. See id. at 96 (laying out three-step framework to address race discrimination in jury selection). Under Batson, if a peremptory challenge by the government is at issue, defendant must make
a prima facie case by: (1) establishing that defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group (or
other protected group); (2) showing that the government’s peremptory challenges excluded members of this cognizable group; and (3) putting forth facts to show that the government’s peremptory
challenges were motivated by the race (or other protected status). If defendant is able to establish
this, the burden shifts to the government to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the juror. Id.
at 97. The trial court then must decide if the government’s articulated race-neutral reason is valid
or pretextual. Id. at 98.
Legal scholars have critiqued the Batson framework, contending it usually does not aid criminal defendants. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 459 (1996) (finding in the seven
years after the Batson decision, criminal defendants succeeded in only 15.87% of Batson challenges); Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859, 1859 (2015) (noting Batson
“has failed to meaningfully reform jury selection”). This Article is not primarily concerned with
Batson per se, but rather with the general recognition of skin color discrimination in civil rights law
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in the U.S. Constitution,
and New York has incorporated Batson’s doctrine into its state law. 4 In
Bridgeforth, the New York Court of Appeals found that the exclusion of a
class of dark-skinned jurors of different races violates the New York Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and section 13 of New York’s Civil Rights
Law. 5 It was a “precedent-setting decision”—the first application of Batson
specifically to skin color discrimination.6
However, Bridgeforth’s significance goes well beyond Batson. Skin
color discrimination, as a claim independent from race discrimination, has
only been recognized under a few civil rights statutes, 7 most notably Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8 Under these statutes, courts have interpreted the term “color” narrowly to apply only to discrimination against a
plaintiff belonging to a subclass of one race: for example, a dark-skinned
African American. Additionally, courts had only recognized such color discrimination claims for individual plaintiffs. But Bridgeforth recognized a
multiracial color class—composed of a group of dark-skinned individuals of
different races. In doing so, the case opens up possibilities for expanding
color-based anti-discrimination law.
Some legal scholars have focused on color discrimination under Title
VII and other civil rights statutes, 9 and various scholars have written about
colorism as a historical and sociological phenomenon which parallels racism. 10 Building on these works, this Article will add several new dimensions.
(and specifically the recognition of a multiracial color class made up of individuals of different
races).
4. People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235 (N.Y. 1990).
5. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 613.
6. See Press Release, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Akin Gump Pens Amicus Brief
in Precedent-Setting Decision by N.Y. Court of Appeals That Skin Color Cannot Be Used as Criterion for Excluding Jurors (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/akingump-pens-amicus-brief-in-precedent-setting-decision-by-ny.html.
7. See infra Part V.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
9. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1705 (2000); Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness
Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color
Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131 (1997); Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity, 93 DENV.
L. REV. 1 (2015); Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the
New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52 (2008); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The
Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Cynthia E. Nance, Colorable Claims: The Continuing
Significance of Color Under Title VII Forty Years After Its Passage, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 435 (2005).
10. COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2014); MARGARET L. HUNTER, RACE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF
SKIN TONE (2005); NINA G. JABLONSKI, LIVING COLOR: THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL MEANING
OF SKIN COLOR (2012); KATHY RUSSELL, MIDGE WILSON & RONALD HALL, THE COLOR
COMPLEX (REVISED): THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR IN A NEW MILLENNIUM (2013); SHADES OF
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It will analyze the changing legal meaning of “color” discrimination in civil
rights law, from the antebellum period to the Reconstruction Era to modern
statutes. In doing so, it is the first scholarly work to examine color discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause—a long-lost twin of the more familiar race discrimination claims. 11 Color-based equal protection existed
long before Bridgeforth, albeit in a different form that was coterminous with
race-based equal protection. The Article will show how “color” was gradually subsumed by “race” in equal protection jurisprudence, until its
reemergence in Bridgeforth. By examining this history, this Article will also
illuminate the changing legal meaning of “color,” which was once used to
represent race and now specifically designates skin color. The Article will
show how Bridgeforth forms a bridge between these two meanings through
its recognition of a multiracial color class. Finally, the Article will lay out
the potential of multiracial color classes for civil rights law and posit initial
strategies to begin realizing this potential.
Part I will delineate the complex relationship between race and color
terminology—particularly the ambiguous use of the term “color.” This Part
will show how “race” and “color” were used interchangeably in the U.S. Census. It also will discuss the phenomenon of colorism—oppression based on
skin color, as differentiated from racism, 12 and it will consider the relationship between racism and colorism.
Part II will analyze color in the antebellum period and will examine Reconstruction Era anti-discrimination laws, including the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It first will consider
how race and color intersected in antebellum law, showing how “color” was
sometimes used interchangeably with “race” and other times used specifically to denote skin color. Against this backdrop, Part II will illustrate that
in the Reconstruction Era, protections against color discrimination focused

DIFFERENCE, WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009); Suzanne G. Fegley
et al., Colorism Embodied: Skin Tone and Psychosocial Well-Being in Adolescence, in
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMBODIMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS 281 (Willis F. Overton
et al. eds., 2008).
11. Scholars have paid relatively little attention to “color” in Reconstruction Era laws. Professor Trina Jones does note use of the term “color” in the Fifteenth Amendment. See Jones, supra
note 9, at 1532 n.188. However, Professor Jones focuses mainly on the history of colorism, color
claims under modern civil rights statutes, and prospects for future claims under these statutes, rather
than on the text and application of Reconstruction Era laws. See generally Jones, supra note 9.
Also, Emily Rose Margolis wrote a student note which focused specifically on extending Bridgeforth to other states. See Emily Rose Margolis, Note, Color as a Batson Class in California, 106
CAL. L. REV. 2067 (2018) (arguing that California and other states should recognize color as Batson
class). Margolis’ work covers only Batson rather than all of equal protection doctrine, and it focuses
on state law rather than the federal Constitution.
12. See infra Part I.B for a more detailed explanation of colorism.
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on racism, not on colorism. This Part also will consider how the Reconstruction Framers came to include both “race” and “color” in their legal enactments. 13
Parts III and IV will focus on color under the Equal Protection Clause.
Part III will show how early equal protection cases considered both race and
color discrimination together and that both were treated as manifestations of
racism. Color and race were equally important, but color did not develop a
legal meaning independent of race. Eventually, as Part IV will illustrate, the
Supreme Court began to use the term “color” less frequently, and race subsumed color in equal protection jurisprudence.
Part V will consider color discrimination claims that have emerged under modern application of civil rights statutes, particularly Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Part will show that modern color anti-discrimination laws target colorism rather than racism. Cases under these statutes have involved individual dark-skinned or light-skinned plaintiffs, often
targeted for discrimination by members of their own racial group (for example, a light-skinned African American discriminating against a dark-skinned
African American).
Part VI will analyze People v. Bridgeforth and discuss how it extends
the scope of color discrimination protections in civil rights law. This Part
will highlight the novel recognition of a multiracial color class, composed of
a group of dark-skinned individuals of different races, for Batson challenges.
Such a multiracial class illustrates how “color” provisions can protect against
more complex forms of discrimination, where members of more than one
racial group are targeted.
Finally, Part VII will consider the future of color-based anti-discrimination law. It will highlight the potential of multiracial color classes to combat
discrimination in an increasingly diverse America. This Part will also posit
strategies for civil rights advocates to work towards this end.

13. This Article does not endorse originalism as the preferred theory of constitutional interpretation. Rather, consistent with many critics of originalism, it acknowledges that original meaning
and intent are significant factors to consider in constitutional and statutory interpretation. See
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2009) (“Not a single selfidentifying non-originalist of whom I’m aware argues that original meaning has no bearing on
proper judicial constitutional interpretation. To the contrary, even those scholars most closely identified with non-originalism––Paul Brest, David Strauss, Laurence Tribe, for example––explicitly
assign original meaning or intentions a significant role in the interpretive enterprise.”); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 881 (1996) (“Virtually
everyone agrees that the specific intentions of the Framers count for something.”).
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I. PROBLEM OF THE “COLOR” LINE
In his 1903 classic, Souls of Black Folk, renowned African-American
scholar W.E.B. Du Bois famously stated, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line—the relation of the darker to the lighter
races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.” 14 Du
Bois articulates how “race” and “color” are intricately linked and often used
interchangeably. “Color” and color-based terms have a “double-consciousness” 15: they can refer either to race or to skin color. 16
This Part examines the dual meaning of “color” to represent race and
skin color. It gives examples of when the term “color” actually denotes race,
and it uses the history of the U.S. Census to illustrate how the government
has even used “race” and “color” interchangeably. But it then shows how
“color” sometimes also specifically designates skin color, differentiated from
race, and it distinguishes “colorism”—social hierarchy based on skin color—
from racism. Finally, this Part considers the relationship between racism and
colorism.
A. “Color” as Race
Color is often used to represent race, and skin color is the physical characteristic most commonly associated with race. The term “color” itself is
sometimes used interchangeably with “race”: For example, one definition of
“color-blind” is one who is “[n]ot influenced by racial prejudice.” 17 Color-

14. W.E.B. DU BOIS, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (Bantam Books 1989) (1903).
15. “Double-consciousness” is a metaphor for duality—often a conflicted duality. Id. at 3 (“It
is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness . . . . One ever feels his two-ness . . . .”). Another
example is Rev. Martin Luther King’s iconic “I Have a Dream” speech at the 1963 March on Washington. Rev. King famously stated: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in
a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.”
Rev. Martin Luther King, Speech at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28,
1963) (emphasis added), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/i-have-dreamaddress-delivered-march-washington-jobs-and-freedom. Rev. King was referring to the elimination
of racial segregation, but he used the term “color of their skin” to denote race.
16. One definition of “color” given by the Oxford dictionary is “pigmentation of the skin, especially as an indication of someone’s race.” Colour, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/colour (last visited May 5, 2020). Another definition is “[a] group of people considered as being distinguished by skin pigmentation.” Id. The former definition refers
directly to skin color, but the latter refers to race itself. “Light-skinned” or “dark-skinned” would
seem to be an appropriate use of the former definition. “Black” and “White” would seem to fit the
second definition, a racial group—although these are color-based terms and are sometimes used to
denote skin color. See Jones, supra note 9, at 1534 (“Today, as in 1866, ‘white’ can refer to both a
racial category and to skin color.”).
17. Colour-blind, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/colourblind (last visited May 5, 2020). Various book titles also use “color” as synonymous with “race.”
See, e.g., K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY
OF RACE (1998); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
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based language denotes race in common parlance: Color terms such as
“Black” and “White” commonly designate specific racial groups. 18 Other
color terms used for racial groups include “yellow” for Asian Americans, 19
“red” for Native Americans, 20 and “brown” for Latinx 21 or South Asian
Americans. 22 Some of these terms are considered to be pejorative, while others are in common use. Additionally, “people of color” and “person of color”
are terms used to denote all people who are not White. Today, “person of
color” is a colloquial term, but in earlier eras it was a legal term defined in
opposition to “white person.” 23
Historically, the U.S. Census illustrates how race and color have been
used interchangeably. 24 As shown in Figure 1, the 1850 U.S. Census was the

AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1980); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); see also Robin A. Lenhardt,
The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071 (2017).
18. “Colored” was once commonly used to refer to people of African descent or other nonWhite people. See Colored, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/colored (last visited May 5, 2020) (giving one “dated, offensive” definition of “colored” as
“[a] person who is wholly or partly of nonwhite descent.”). In many states, it was once a legal term
designating such persons. See, e.g., STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 237 (Pauli Murray ed.,
Univ. of Ga. Press 1997) (1951) (defining “colored” as “includ[ing] not only Negroes but persons
of mixed blood having any appreciable amount of Negro blood.” (citing MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263
(repealed 1987)). Although “colored” is now considered pejorative in the United States, it is still in
colloquial usage in some parts of the world. See Lindsay Johns, Say It Loud, I’m Coloured and I’m
Proud, ROOT (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:50 AM), https://www.theroot.com/say-it-loud-im-coloured-and-improud-1790898391 (noting “[i]n a South African context, ‘Coloured’ is a wholly acceptable
word.”). Moreover, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is
still the name of a major U.S. civil rights organization.
19. See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002) (analyzing the plight of Asian Americans).
20. See TROY R. JOHNSON, RED POWER: THE NATIVE AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(2007).
21. OTTO SANTA ANNA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE (2002).
22. See VIJAY PRASHAD, THE KARMA OF BROWN FOLK (2000) (analyzing the plight of South
Asian Americans).
23. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 79-103 (1935) (defining “person[] of color” as “[a]ll Negroes,
mulattoes, mestizos, and their descendants, having any ascertainable trace of either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood . . . and all descendants of [such persons] . . . .”) (cited in
STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18, at 90). In contrast to this definition of “person
of color,” the official definition of “White person” in Georgia was:
[O]nly persons of the white or Caucasian race, who have no ascertainable trace of either
Negro, African, West Indian, Asiatic Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in
their veins. No person, any one of whose ancestors has been duly registered with the
State Bureau of Vital Statistics as a colored person or person of color, shall be deemed a
white person.
Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 53-212).
24. See generally Index of Questions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/ (last visited May 5, 2020).
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first to collect information about an individual’s color. 25 There was no mention of “race” on the census form, and the options for “Color” were “Black”
and “Mulatto,” with instruction to leave the column blank if the person was
“White.” 26 The directions for the 1860 census form explicitly added “White”
as a “Color” category, 27 and the 1870 28 and 1880 29 census forms added other
“Color” categories such as “Chinese” and “American Indian.” 30 Interestingly, the 1890 census form used “Race” instead of “Color,” 31 and census
forms from 1900 to 1940 collected data on “Color or race.” 32 In 1950, the
census form went back to “Race” only; 33 in 1960 it was “Race or color,” 34
and in 1970, it was “Color or race.” 35 Subsequent censuses only collected
data on an individual’s “Race.” 36

25. 1850, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1850_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020). From 1790 to 1840, the Census
did not specifically use the terms “race” or “color,” although it did collect data on the number of
White people, slaves, and in some instances “colored persons.” See generally Index of Questions,
supra note 24.
26. 1850, supra note 25.
27. 1860, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1860_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020).
28. 1870, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1870_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020).
29. 1880, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1880_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020).
30. Future censuses continued to add and replace categories. See generally Index of Questions,
supra note 24.
31. 1890, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1890_1.html (last visited May 5, 2020).
32. See generally Index of Questions, supra note 24.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/his33. 1950
(Population),
U.S.
tory/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1950_population.html (last visited May 5,
2020).
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/his34. 1960
(Population),
U.S.
tory/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1960_population.html (last visited May 5,
2020).
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/his35. 1970
(Population),
U.S.
tory/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/1970_population.html (last visited May 5,
2020).
36. See generally Index of Questions, supra note 24.
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Figure 1: “Race” and “Color” in the U.S. Census
Year(s)
Language on Questionnaire
1850 – 1880
Color
1890
Race
1900 – 1940
Color or Race
1950
Race
1960
Race or Color
1970
Color or Race
1980 – present
Race
The use of color terminology to refer to race came about because
throughout U.S. history, skin color has served as a proxy for race. 37 Race
actually derives from a complex amalgamation of factors: ancestry, common
stereotypes, self-identification, and various physical features including skin
color. 38 Racial categories are not biological groupings but rather social constructs: 39 As the U.S. Census illustrates, these categories can change over
time. 40 Skin color as a proxy for race can be misleading—as with a Black
person who can “pass” for White.41 Nevertheless, in everyday interactions,
skin color is often the primary means of identifying a person’s race and discriminating on the basis of race. Consequently, older civil rights law often
viewed “color” as interchangeable with “race,” and both race and color antidiscrimination provisions targeted racism.
B. “Color” as Skin Color
In modern civil rights law, “color” specifically means skin color, not
merely as a marker of race, but as a separate feature with its own axis of

37. See Jones, supra note 9, at 1534 (noting that during the Reconstruction Era, “race and color
were viewed as overlapping, but nonetheless distinct, phenomena”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Multiracialism and the Social Construction of Race: The Story of Hudgins v. Wrights, in RACE LAW
STORIES 147, 148 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008) (noting that “skin color”
is “the most commonly used proxy for race”).
38. See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (defining “‘race’ as a vast group
of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of their
morphology and/or ancestry”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 37, at 147.
39. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 115 (1962) (noting that race is a “social and conventional, not a biological
concept”); Mary E. Campbell, Jenifer L. Bratter & Wendy D. Roth, Measuring the Diverging Components of Race, 60 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 381, 382 (2016).
40. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 24–36.
41. “Passing” refers to situations where a Black person (or other person of color) is perceived
by others as White and tacitly encourages that perception. See generally ALLYSON HOBBS, A
CHOSEN EXILE: A HISTORY OF RACIAL PASSING IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014).
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discrimination and inequality. 42 Colorism typically refers to social hierarchy
and oppression based on skin color, 43 as opposed to race itself. 44 Often, but
not always, this involves favoring individuals with lighter skin over those
with darker skin. 45 Such discrimination is the target of modern color antidiscrimination provisions.
Colorism is often framed as a within-group phenomenon: for example,
light-skinned Black Americans discriminating against dark-skinned Black
Americans, or vice versa. 46 However, outgroup members such as White
Americans can also specifically favor Black Americans who are lighter or
darker, 47 and this can make it more difficult to distinguish between colorism
and racism.
Colorism has long existed in societies across the world, 48 and it is woven
together with racism in various ways. 49 In the United States, colorism has its

42. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Where Is the Love? A Rejoinder by Bonilla-Silva on the Latin
Americanization Thesis, 5 RACE & SOC’Y 103, 110 (2002) (arguing that “color is a central feature
of social stratification”).
43. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Introduction: From Ferguson to Geneva and Back Again, 14
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (2015).
44. See Jones, supra note 9, at 1490 (noting that “color differences are still frequently used as
a basis for discrimination independently of racial categorization”); Lori L. Tharps, The Difference
Between Racism and Colorism, TIME (Oct. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4512430/colorism-in-america/. But see Taunya Lovell Banks, Multilayered Racism: Courts’ Continued Resistance to Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS, supra note 10, at 213, 222
(arguing that colorism itself is a form of racism); infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
45. See Baynes, supra note 9, at 133 (“A dark-skinned person of color is likely to encounter
more discrimination than [their] light-skinned counterpart.” (footnote omitted)). But see Jones, supra note 9, at 1520 (“Colorism among Blacks does not operate uniformly in favor of persons with
lighter skins.”). The interaction of skin color and race discrimination can be complex. For example,
one study found that dark-skinned Black men perceived that they experienced more out-group discrimination (by members of other racial groups) than light-skinned Black men; however, both darkskinned and light-skinned Black men perceived that they experienced more in-group discrimination
(by other African Americans) than medium skin tone Black males. See Ekeoma E. Uzogara et al.,
A Comparison of Skin Tone Discrimination Among African American Men: 1995 and 2003, 15
PSYCHOL. OF MEN & MASCULINITY 201, 201 (2014).
46. See ALICE WALKER, If the Present Looks Like the Past, What Does the Future Look Like?,
in IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHER’S GARDENS 290, 290–91 (1983) (“Colorism—in my definition, [is]
prejudicial or preferential treatment of same-race people based solely on their color . . . .”); see also
Jones, supra note 9, at 1520.
47. Jones, supra note 9, at 1498–99 (“It is important to note that colorism operates both intraracially and interracially. Intraracial colorism occurs when a member of one racial group makes a
distinction based upon skin color between members of [their] own race. . . . Interracial colorism
occurs when a member of one racial group makes a distinction based upon skin color between members of another racial group.” (footnotes omitted)).
48. See generally Sadat, supra note 43.
49. See Vinay Harpalani, To Be White, Black, or Brown? South Asian Americans and the RaceColor Distinction, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 609, 636 (2015) (highlighting the “intersection between racism and colorism”).
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roots in differential treatment of Black slaves by White slave owners. 50 During the era of slavery, White slave owners coerced enslaved Black women to
engage in sexual relationships, resulting in mixed-race children. 51 Several
categories of mixed-race individuals were defined under law: mulatto (onehalf Black), quadroon (one-quarter Black), and octoroon (one-eighth
Black). 52 Professor Robert Reece notes that White people generally saw
mixed-race slaves, who on average had lighter skin, as more intelligent and
“more capable of being ‘civilized.’” 53 He notes that slave owners were twice
as likely to free mixed-race slaves as those slaves who were classified solely
as Black, 54 an assertion supported by other historical sources as well. 55
Among the enslaved, a color hierarchy also developed. Generally, those
with more White ancestry had lighter skin and were treated in a more privileged fashion than their dark-skinned counterparts. 56 Plantation owners
sometimes conferred special favors to mixed-race slaves who were their own
offspring. 57 Mixed-race slaves could hold more prestigious positions, working within plantation owners’ houses rather than in the fields of plantations. 58
Sometimes they were able to acquire skills and learning, including literacy,
and they could be hired out to work away from slave plantations. 59 This gave
lighter-skinned, mixed-race slaves more mobility around the plantation and

50. See generally Jones, supra note 9, at 1499–511.
51. Id.
52. Fegley et al., supra note 10, at 286.
53. See Robert L. Reece, Genesis of U.S. Colorism and Skin Tone Stratification: Slavery, Freedom, and Mulatto-Black Occupational Inequality in the Late 19th Century, 45 REV. OF BLACK POL.
ECON. 3, 8 (2018).
54. Id. at 8. Professor Reece reports that in 1860, forty-one percent of “free African Americans” in the South were of mixed race, including seventy-six percent in the Deep South, and that
only about ten percent of mixed-race individuals were enslaved. Id.
55. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Color Differentiation in the American Systems of Slavery,
3 J. OF INTERDISC. HIST. 509, 514 (1973) (noting that “[i]n the Southern United States, mulattoes
comprised a large proportion of the so-called ‘free Negroes,’ and, in the eighteenth century, perhaps
as many as half of all mulattoes were free.”). Professor Horowitz further notes that “[m]ost of the
Negroes who enjoyed any prosperity were mulattoes.” Id. Nevertheless, he qualifies this by stating
that “[i]n several southern cities, propertied mulattoes were more common,” including Charleston,
South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Mobile, Alabama; and New Orleans, Louisiana. Id. at 514,
514 n.20. Although he acknowledges that mixed race individuals were a large proportion of free
Black Americans, Professor Horowitz’s general view is that “by and large, through nearly all of the
slavery period, free browns and blacks had the same generally low status.” Id. at 514.
56. See Ira Berlin, Time, Space, and the Evolution of Afro-American Society on British Mainland North America, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 44, 64–65 (1980); Reece, supra note 53, at 8 (noting many
privileges afforded to light-skinned, mixed-race slaves but not to dark-skinned slaves).
57. See Berlin, supra note 56, at 53.
58. Reece, supra note 53, at 8.
59. Id.
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off of it. 60 Consequently, they had distinct advantages over dark-skinned
monoracial Black Americans even when both were enslaved.61
Professor Reece has empirically linked skin color inequalities after
Emancipation to the social boundaries that were formed during slavery. 62 Because they were much more likely to be free even before Emancipation and
more likely to have acquired skills if they had been enslaved, mixed-race
individuals were able to garner more wealth than monoracial Black Americans. 63 Professor Reece’s findings indicate that the antebellum color hierarchy, with relatively light-skinned mixed-race individuals at the top and relatively dark-skinned monoracial Black Americans at the bottom, continued
after slavery ended. 64 Drawing upon U.S. Census data, his findings indicate
that in 1880—shortly after Emancipation—the occupational status disparity
between mixed-race individuals and monoracial Black Americans was
greater in areas where slavery had been more prominent, 65 and free mixedrace individuals were more literate. 66 Professor Reece also notes that after
Emancipation, mixed-race individuals were more likely to marry other
mixed-race individuals, thus compounding the wealth differences between
light-skinned and dark-skinned Black Americans and further replicating the
color stratification that existed during slavery. 67
All of these biases and inequities became a normalized component of
Black communities. Although all Black Americans were subjected to Jim
Crow laws and other forms of oppression, 68 both White and Black people
60. Id.
61. See also Berlin, supra note 56, at 64–65 (“While one branch of black society [light-skinned
people of color] stood so close to whites that its members sometimes disappeared into the white
population, most plantation slaves [who were dark-skinned and monoracial] remained alienated
from the world of their masters, physically and culturally.”). But see Horowitz, supra note 55, at
514 (“From time to time, the tendency of whites to differentiate mulattoes from Negroes manifested
itself, but it never became dominant.” (footnote omitted)).
62. Reece, supra note 53, at 9.
63. Id. at 3 (noting that “skin color stratification was initiated at least in part by practices during
chattel slavery”). Professor Reece does acknowledge the need for more research on the transmission
of light-skin privilege from slavery onwards. Id. at 19.
64. Id. at 17.
65. Id. at 15 (“[C]ounties with higher historical proportions of slaves [prior to Emancipation]
had, on average, higher Mulatto-Black occupational inequality [in 1880], with Mulattos advantaged
relative to their Black counterparts.”).
66. Id. at 17 (“Mulattos in counties where they could read and write in 1860 had, on average,
higher occupational status in 1880.”).
67. Id. at 18.
68. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896) (noting that Petitioner Homer Plessy
“was seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was
not discernible in him” but still ruling that he had to ride railroad cars with only Black passengers);
STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18, at 237 (defining “colored” as “includ[ing] not
only Negroes but persons of mixed blood having any appreciable amount of Negro blood.” (citing
Moreau v. Grandich, 75 So. 434 (1917))).
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viewed people with lighter skin in a superior light. During the Jim Crow Era,
historically Black colleges and universities discriminated against darkskinned applicants, as did many other Black institutions. 69 Elite social clubs
such as the Blue Vein Society of Nashville, Tennessee, and the Bon Ton Society of Washington, D.C., also favored light-skinned Black Americans. 70
Skin color became a marker of social status within Black communities, and
White Americans also continued to favor light-skinned Black Americans. 71
Although the Black Power Movement of the 1960s elevated pride among
dark-skinned African Americans, colorism is still a prominent topic of discussion in Black communities. Renowned film director Spike Lee’s movie,
School Daze, dealt with colorism at a historically Black college. 72 More recently, an episode of the popular ABC sitcom, Black-ish, focused on skin
color bias. 73 Many other Black commentators have also examined these issues. 74
69. Fegley et al., supra note 10, at 286.
70. Id. Two tests to determine whether an individual’s skin was light enough were the “blue
vein” test and the “paper bag” test. Jones, supra note 9, at 1515–16. Under the “blue vein” test,
members had to have skin light enough so that the veins were visible in their arms. Id. at 1515. For
the “paper bag” text, skin had to be lighter than a brown paper bag. Id. at 1515–16.
71. See Taunya Lovell Banks, A Darker Shade of Pale Revisited: Disaggregated Blackness
and Colorism in the “Post-Racial” Obama Era, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE
MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 95, 101 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2014) (noting that Nobel
laureate Gunnar Myrdal, “in his classic [1944] study of blacks in the United States, wrote: ‘without
a doubt a Negro with light skin and other European features has in the North an advantage with
white people when competing for jobs available to Negroes’” (quoting MYRDAL, supra note 39, at
697)). In 2010, journalists Mark Halperin and John Heilemann revealed that Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid had once privately stated that “[Barack] Obama, as a black candidate, could be successful thanks, in part, to his ‘light-skinned’ appearance and speaking patterns.” Mark Preston, Reid
Apologizes for Racial Remarks About Obama During Campaign, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 9, 2010,
11:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/09/obama.reid/index.html. Although Reid
apologized for these comments, many Black Americans found truth in his sentiments. See Jake
Tapper & Karen Travers, Reid's Racial Remark: Some Truth to It?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010, 5:38
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/senator-harry-reids-racial-remarks-truth-studies-critics/story?id=9535416 (“Many prominent African Americans … said [Reid’s] observation was
true—that Americans in general find lighter-skinned African Americans more socially acceptable
than those with darker skin, especially if they speak eloquently.”).
72. SCHOOL DAZE (Columbia Pictures & 40 Acres & A Mule Filmworks 1988).
73. Black-ish: Black Like Us (ABC television broadcast Jan. 15, 2019); see Sydney Scott,
“Black-ish” Poignantly Tackled Colorism with an Honest Family Conversation, ESSENCE (Jan. 16,
2019), https://www.essence.com/entertainment/black-ish-colorism-episode/.
74. See, e.g., DARK GIRLS (Urban Winter Entertainment & Duke Media 2011). Some commentators have discussed colorism in casting and portrayal of Black actors. See, e.g., Tiffany
Onyejiaka, Hollywood’s Colorism Problem Can’t Be Ignored Any Longer, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 22,
2017), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/hollywoods-colorism-problem-cant-be-ignored; Tysheira
Scribner, A Look at 90s TV and Colorism, BLACK 90S (Apr. 30, 2018), http://theblack90s.com/uncategorized/a-look-at-90s-tv-and-colorism/. There are also examples of Black artists whose work
has implicitly critiqued colorism within Black communities. See Jamilah King, J. Cole Talks About
Colorism in Hip-Hop and the White House, COLORLINES (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:12 PM),
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/j-cole-talks-about-colorism-hip-hop-and-white-house.
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Beyond African-American communities, there has been increased attention to colorism within other groups, including Latinx, 75 Asian Americans, 76
South Asian Americans, 77 Native Americans, 78 and biracial and multiracial
Americans. 79 On a global scale, commentators have analyzed skin color biases in Latin America, 80 Africa, 81 Asia, 82 and South Asia. 83 Additionally,
international human rights activists have begun to address colorism. 84
Despite this growing awareness, there are challenges to addressing disparities based on skin color. Colorism is difficult to track empirically because unlike formal racial categories, 85 there are no government data which

Sometimes critiques of colorism have been controversial: for example, when they affirmed the
beauty of dark-skinned Black women but also belittled light-skinned Black women. See, e.g., Del
tha Funky Homosapien, Dark Skin Girls, on I WISH MY BROTHER GEORGE WAS HERE (Elektra
Records 1991) (stating that “[l]ight skin girls lack the dark skin quality” and “[d]ark skin girls are
better than light skin”). For lyrics to Dark Skin Girls see Dark Skin Girls, GENIUS, https://genius.com/8928001 (last visited May 6, 2020); see also Preezy, Del Tha Funky Homosapiens Offbeat
Debut Helped Shape West Coast Alt-Rap, BOOMBOX (Oct. 25, 2016), https://theboombox.com/deltha-funky-homosapiens-offbeat-debut-helped-shape-west-coast-alt-rap/ (noting that Dark Skin
Girls was “abrasive” and “would clearly be called out for misogyny and colorism [against lightskinned Black women] today.”).
75. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Latinos at Work: When Color Discrimination Involves More
Than Color, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS, supra note 10, at 236.
76. See Kimberly D. Chanbonpin, Between Black and White: The Coloring of Asian Americans, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 637 (2015).
77. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism Among South Asians: Title VII and Skin Tone Discrimination, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 665 (2015); Harpalani, supra note 49, at 610,
635.
78. See Donna Brown, Karen Branden & Ronald E. Hall, Native American Colorism: From
Historical Manifestations to the Current Era, 62 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 2023 (2018).
79. See Keshia L. Harris, Biracial American Colorism: Passing for White, 62 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 2072 (2018).
80. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Colorism and the Law in Latin America—Global Perspectives on Colorism Conference Remarks, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 683 (2015).
81. See Pumza Fihlani, Africa: Where Black Is Not Really Beautiful, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20444798.
82. See Debito Arudou, Japan’s Under-Researched Visible Minorities: Applying Critical Race
Theory to Racialization Dynamics in a Non-White Society, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
695 (2015).
83. See Neha Mishra, India and Colorism: The Finer Nuances, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV. 725 (2015).
84. See William J. Aceves, Two Stories About Skin Color and International Human Rights
Advocacy, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 563 (2015); Stephanie Farrior, “Color” in the NonDiscrimination Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Two Covenants,
14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 751 (2015).
85. See Vinay Harpalani, DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South Asian Americans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 77, 111 (2013) (defining “formal racialization” as “the
creation and application of official racial classification schemes by the government or another
source of authority”); see id. at 135–36 (noting how U.S. Census racial classification of Asian Indian
Americans changed from “Non-White/Hindu” in 1960 to “White” in 1970 to “Asian Indian” in
1980).
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classify individuals based on their skin color. 86 There have been social science studies collecting and analyzing data that provide illustrations of colorism. For example, Professors Michael Hughes and Bradley Hertel report that
even after controlling for gender, age, and parental socioeconomic status,
light-skinned African Americans complete more years of education than
dark-skinned African Americans. 87 Professor Amelia Branigan and her colleagues come to a similar conclusion. 88 A study by Professors Arthur Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton, and William Darity finds that employers prefer
light-skinned African-American employees over those with dark skin, 89 and
Professors Verna Keith and Cedric Herring find that light-skinned African
Americans had personal income that was sixty-five percent higher than darkskinned African Americans. 90 Other studies, in a variety of areas, 91 have also
86. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, We Are All Americans!: The Latin Americanization of Racial
Stratification in the USA, 5 RACE & SOC’Y 3, 5 (2002) (“[T]here is no data set that includes systematic data on the skin tone of all Americans . . . .”).
87. Michael Hughes & Bradley R. Hertel, The Significance of Color Remains: A Study of Life
Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic Consciousness Among Black Americans, 68 SOC. FORCES
1105, 1109 (1990).
88. See Amelia R. Branigan et al., Skin Color, Sex, and Educational Attainment in the PostCivil Rights Era, 42 SOC. SCI. RES. 1659, 1659 (2013) [hereinafter Branigan et al., Skin Color, Sex,
and Educational Attainment] (finding that “[f]or Black men and women . . . increase in skin lightness . . . [is] associated with . . . increase in educational attainment.”). But see Aaron Gullickson,
The Significance of Color Declines: A Re-Analysis of Skin Tone Differentials in Post-Civil Rights
America, 84 SOC. FORCES 157, 172–73 (2006) (“Beginning with cohorts born in the 1940s, skin
tone differences in educational and occupational attainment which have traditionally privileged
lighter-skinned blacks declined significantly. The decline was so dramatic that skin tone does not
appear to have been relevant at all for cohorts born . . . [by] 1963.”). Another study by Branigan et
al. suggests there may be a gender difference for the relationship between skin color and educational
attainment. See Amelia R. Branigan et al., The Shifting Salience of Skin Color for Educational
Attainment, 5 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2019) [hereinafter Branigan et al., Shifting Salience of Skin Color] (finding that there is “a large and statistically significant decline in the association between skin color
and educational attainment between baby boomer and millennial black women, whereas the decline
in this association between the two cohorts of black men is smaller and nonsignificant”). The authors note that the “results emphasize the need to conceptualize colorism as an intersectional problem and suggest caution when generalizing evidence of colorism in earlier cohorts to young adults
today.” Id.
89. Arthur H. Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton & William Darity, Jr., Shades of Discrimination:
Skin Tone and Wages, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 242, 245 (2006) (finding “[e]mployers . . . display a
preference for light-skinned [African Americans]” over those with darker skin).
90. Verna M. Keith & Cedric Herring, Skin Tone and Stratification in the Black Community,
97 AM. J. SOC. 760, 769 (1991). Another study found that “protective effects of economic success
are not as prevalent among darker-skinned African Americans as they are among those with lighter
skin.” Elizabeth Sweet et al., Relationships Between Skin Color, Income, and Blood Pressure
Among African Americans in the CARDIA Study, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2253, 2256 (2007).
91. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hochschild & Vesla Weaver, The Skin Color Paradox and the American Racial Order, 86 SOC. FORCES 643, 643 (2007) (“Dark-skinned [B]lacks in the United States
have lower socioeconomic status, more punitive relationships with the criminal justice system, diminished prestige, and less likelihood of holding elective office compared with their lighter counterparts.”); Jessica M. Kizer, Arrested by Skin Color: Evidence from Siblings and a Nationally Representative Sample, 3 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2017) (“[H]aving darker skin remains a significant predictor for
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illustrated that colorism, like racism, is still a powerful force in American and
global society.
C. Racism or Colorism?
In the course of American civil rights law, “color” discrimination has
had two different meanings: It can be the manifestation of either racism or
colorism. Historically, the law has sometimes treated “race” and “color” as
synonymous, thus equating color discrimination with race discrimination. 92
But at other times, the law has differentiated between race and color and thus
separated colorism from racism. 93
Scholarly discourse on color discrimination also reflects this type of dichotomy. Professor Taunya Lovell Banks emphasizes the role of skin color
in how individuals experience race, and in “how race-related discrimination
is manifested.” 94 Professor Banks argues that colorism itself is one of “the
varied faces of racism” 95 and that skin color discrimination should be treated
as a form of race discrimination. 96 Conversely, Professor Trina Jones
acknowledges that skin color is often used to indicate race, but she cautions
against “confus[ing] the indicator with the thing that it is indicating.” 97 Professor Jones argues that “[w]ith colorism, skin color does not serve as an indicator of race. . . . it is the social meaning afforded skin color itself that results in the differential treatment.” 98
This duality in the meaning of “color” is an overarching theme for a
historical survey of color-based anti-discrimination law and for its potential
future applications. The next Part examines the ambiguous legal understandings of color in early American history. This paves the way to analyze the
evolution of color discrimination in American civil rights law.
being arrested.”); Ellis P. Monk, The Color of Punishment: African Americans, Skin Tone, and the
Criminal Justice System, 42 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1593 (2018) (“[A]mong African Americans[] . . . [darker] skin tone is significantly associated with the probability of having been arrested
and/or incarcerated, net of relevant controls.”); Ellis P. Monk, Jr., The Cost of Skin Color: Skin
Color, Discrimination, and Health Among African Americans, 121 AM. J. SOC. 396, 396 (2015)
[hereinafter Monk, Cost of Skin Color] (“Intraracial health differences related to skin tone (and
discrimination) often rival or even exceed disparities between blacks and whites as a whole.”). But
see Amelia R. Branigan et al., Complicating Colorism: Race, Skin Color, and the Likelihood of
Arrest, 3 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2017) (“[B]lack men’s probability of arrest remains constant across the spectrum of skin color . . . .”). Ironically, Branigan et al. found that among White males, arrest probability did increase with darker skin. Id.
92. See infra notes 338, 373–374 and accompanying text; infra Part III.D.3.
93. See infra note 390 and accompanying text; infra Parts V.A. and V.C.
94. Banks, supra note 44, at 222.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 216.
97. Trina Jones, The Case for Legal Recognition of Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF
DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS, supra note 10, at 223, 225.
98. Id. at 225.
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II. COLOR OF LAW
Dating back to early American history, the term “color,” along with
other color terminology, has sometimes denoted race and at other times referred to skin color. Whiteness was historically a prerequisite for citizenship
rights in the United States, both at the federal and the state levels. Under the
Naturalization Law of 1790, Congress restricted federal citizenship to “free,
white person[s],” 99 and the meaning of “white person” under this statute was
litigated in federal courts.100 In state courts, definitions of Whiteness and
Blackness were also litigated. Blackness could confer slave status, and antebellum cases in Southern states confronted the dilemma of determining
race. 101 Skin color played a role in these cases,102 which provided a backdrop
to Reconstruction Era anti-discrimination laws protecting against race and
color discrimination.
A. Constructing Color
During the antebellum era, between the late 18th century and the Civil
War, the relationship between race and color became part of the law of slavery. Skin color could not only denote hierarchy among slaves, 103 but could
itself confer status as a free person or a slave.
Professor Ariela Gross analyzes several cases where slaves sued for
their freedom on the ground that they were not Black. 104 Professor Gross
notes that common law in Southern states had “established a presumption of
freedom for persons of white appearance and of slavery for persons of black
appearance.” 105 For example, in the Arkansas case of Daniel v. Guy, 106 the

99. Naturalization Law of 1790, ch. 3, 103, 103–04 (repealed 1795).
100. See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 49–77
(1996). These “racial prerequisite” cases occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Id. at 49. Skin color did not play a significant role in most of these cases. Between 1878 and
1944, federal courts heard fifty-one “racial prerequisite” cases. Id. In only one of these cases was
skin color a determining factor. See United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1910) (holding
that Petitioner Abba Dolla was White because the “skin of [Dolla’s] arm . . . was sufficiently transparent for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly”).
Reconstruction Era legal enactments granted citizenship to African Americans, thus creating
another potential venue for naturalization. Haney López, supra note 38. There was one case litigated under the 1790 Act where the Petitioner, a Mexican American, argued his Blackness conferred
citizenship. See In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
101. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the NineteenthCentury South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998).
102. Id.
103. See supra note 56.
104. Gross, supra note 101.
105. Id. at 122 n.33 (emphasis omitted).
106. 19 Ark. 121 (1857).
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court noted, “Where a person held as a slave, sues for freedom, and it manifestly appears that he belongs to the negro race . . . he is presumed to be a
slave . . . .” 107
However, two factors complicated these presumptions. 108 First, as
mixed racial ancestry became more common, appearance was sometimes too
ambiguous to determine race. 109 Second, Native Americans could also have
dark skin, and establishing Native American ancestry could negate slave status. 110 Consequently, racial identity became legally contested. 111
Courts highlighted the importance of skin color in determining a person’s race, although they noted that factors such as ancestry and reputation
also mattered. In the South Carolina case of State v. Scott, 112 the court
opined:
[A]lthough colour would in general be a safe guide in determining
the genealogy . . . it is not an infallible criterion . . . . When the colour is distinctly marked, that of itself would furnish a presumption
of the class to which the individual belonged. In a doubtful case,
common reputation, which is always admissible in the deduction
of pedigree, would serve as a guide. But these, as mere presumptions, must yield to positive proof . . . . 113
Similarly, in State v. Davis, 114 also in South Carolina, the court stated race
determination was a factual question for juries, based on “inspection as to
colour . . . peculiar negro features . . . reputation as to parentage; and . . . evidence . . . of the person’s having been received in society, and exercised the
privileges of a white man.” 115

107. Id. at 134 (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Whitaker, 3 Del. (1 Harr.) 549, 550 (1840)
(referring to “color” as “badge of [slave] status”).
108. Gross, supra note 101, at 122.
109. Id.
110. Id. In Hudgins v. Wright, a family in Virginia sued for freedom on grounds of their Native
American ancestry. 1 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 140 (1806) (holding that plaintiffs were free because
of their straight hair). For more on Hudgins, see Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 37.
111. See generally Paul Finkleman, Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2108–09 (1993)
(“[D]uring the Revolutionary and early post-Revolutionary period race definition . . . [was] a relatively easy task—physical appearance or ancestry would suffice. This would soon change.”); Gross,
supra note 101.
112. 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 270 (1829).
113. Id. at 273; see also Daniel, 19 Ark. at 134 (“Where a person held as a slave, sues for freedom, and it manifestly appears that he belongs to the negro race, whether of full or mixed blood, he
is presumed to be a slave, that being the condition generally of such people in this State.” (emphasis
omitted)).
114. 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 558 (1832).
115. Id. at 560. Similarly, in Thurman v. State, the court noted that “[a] mulatto is to be known,
not solely by color, kinky hair, or slight admixture of negro blood, or by a greater admixture of it
not amounting to one-half, but by reputation, by his reception into society, and by the exercise of
certain privileges.” 18 Ala. 276, 277 (1850).
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The role of skin color in these complex definitions of race varied by
locality. States had their own different criteria for determining a person’s
race, and legal definitions and common understandings of race varied significantly. 116 In the Ohio case of Gray v. State, 117 the court used skin color alone
to simplify the definition: “We are unable to set out any other plain and obvious line or mark between the different races. Color alone is sufficient.” 118
The relationship between skin color and legal definitions of race was
also changing over time. Ohio itself illustrated this: Professor Daniel Sharfstein notes that at the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1850-51, one delegate stated that “treatment of the negro” was based on “the color of his skin”
and “by ‘color’ in these discussions we do not mean color at all. . . . you must
get his genealogy . . . he must stand condemned as a person of ‘color’ . . . the
mixture never runs out. . . . Ten or ten thousand times diluted by mixtures
with the Caucasian race, and it is still the same.” 119 According to Professor
Sharfstein, “[i]n Ohio, blood was eclipsing skin color” as the defining feature
of race. 120
At the same time, the 1850 U.S. Census collected demographic information about “color,” not “race.” 121 Moreover, Census color categories included terms such as “Mulatto,” 122 which speak to ancestry rather than skin
color. In some contexts, race and color were the same; in other contexts, they
were different; and at times, it was not easy to tell whether they were the
same or different. Against this historical backdrop, the Reconstruction Era
Framers had to grapple with drafting anti-discrimination laws—laws that
came to include both “race” and “color” in their enacted text.
B. Reconstructing Color
In the aftermath of the Civil War and Emancipation, the key goal of
Reconstruction laws was to secure citizenship rights for African Americans.
The Reconstruction Era first saw the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment
116. See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop
Rule, 1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 604 (2007) (“Depending on the state, anyone with at least
one-quarter, one-eighth, or one-sixteenth ‘black blood’ was legally black.”). See generally STATES’
LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18.
117. 4 Ohio 353 (1831).
118. Id. at 355.
119. Sharfstein, supra note 116, at 649 (emphasis omitted) (citing FRANK U. QUILLIN, THE
COLOR LINE IN OHIO: A HISTORY OF RACE PREJUDICE IN A TYPICAL NORTHERN STATE 87 (1913)).
120. Id.; see also id. at 652 (“Color is becoming every day less and less a test by which to
determine the fact of human chattelship.” (quoting White Slaves, PHILANTHROPIST, Nov. 12, 1839,
at 3)); id. at 647 (“It is not the shade of color, but the purity of the blood, which determines the stock
or race to which the individual belongs.” (quoting Thacker v. Hawk, 11 Ohio 376, 380 (1842) (Read,
J., dissenting))).
121. 1850, supra note 25.
122. Id.
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to abolish slavery. 123 Subsequently, to grant citizenship rights to African
Americans, three major laws were enacted: (1) The Civil Rights Act of
1866, 124 which was the first civil rights law to include the terms “race” and
“color”; (2) The Fourteenth Amendment, 125 which contained the Equal Protection Clause and was widely understood as an effort to constitutionalize the
1866 Act; 126 and (3) The Fifteenth Amendment, 127 which is the only provision in the U.S. Constitution to include the terms “race” and “color.” The
text of both the 1866 Act and the Fifteenth Amendment suggests that “race”
and “color” have different meanings, lest this text violate the rule against
surplusage. 128 But what are those different meanings, and how did the Fram-

123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. For more on the history of the Thirteenth Amendment, see William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents
of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311 (2007); Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951).
124. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
126. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 115 (1988) (“[S]ection one [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was understood
to remove all doubts about the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act . . . .”). During floor
debate on the Act, Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania questioned whether the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 would be constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, which he read narrowly to abolish slavery and nothing more:
As I understand the chairman of Committee on the Judiciary, he takes his ground upon
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States recently passed. . . . [N]obody
can pretend, nobody can believe that it was intended by [the first clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment] of the Constitution to confer . . . such authority [to pass the provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866].
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
128. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that
any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction
is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”). Marbury suggests that words in the Constitution
cannot be interpreted as “mere surplusage . . . entirely without meaning.” Id. See also Hibbs v.
Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” (quoting
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th
ed. 2000))); United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 497 (1997) (“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))); Walker v.
Sec’y of the Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403, 406 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (“[T]he statutes and case law repeatedly and distinctly refer to race and color. This court is left with no choice but to conclude, when
Congress and the Supreme Court refer to race and color in the same phrase, that ‘race’ is to mean
‘race’, and ‘color’ is to mean ‘color’. To hold otherwise would mean that Congress and the Supreme
Court have either mistakenly or purposefully overlooked an obvious redundancy.” (emphasis omitted)); see also infra note 390.
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ers of these Reconstruction laws come to include both terms? The congressional debates over Reconstruction laws provide some insight into these
questions. 129
1. Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, in its original version, was the first Reconstruction law to include “race” and “color” in its text.130 The Act was
deemed to be “[a]n Act to protect all [p]ersons in the United States in their
[c]ivil [r]ights, and furnish the [m]eans of their [v]indication.” 131 Congress
passed the Act over President Andrew Johnson’s veto, approximately one
year after the Civil War ended. Section 1 of the Act states:
[A]ll persons born in the United States . . . excluding Indians not
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same
right . . . to [various facets of citizenship, property rights, and equal
protection] . . . as is enjoyed by [W]hite [persons] . . . . 132
Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 also gave legal effect to both race
and color through criminal law: It deemed that that any person who caused
any of the rights protected by the Act to be deprived on account of “color or
race” would be guilty of a misdemeanor. 133
In the congressional floor debate on the 1866 Act, Senator Edgar Cowan
specifically noted the ambiguity of each term:
[T]ell me what is meant by the word “race,” and where it is settled
that there are two races of men, and if it is settled that there are two
or more, how many. Where is the line to be drawn? What constitute the distinctive characteristics and marks which limit and bound
these races? . . . “[C]olor” is another word upon which nobody is
very well advised just at present. Men are of all shades of color,

129. See ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES 121–29, 131–34,
136–41 (1967).
130. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was reenacted as the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. See infra
text accompanying notes 318–319. The 1870 Act did not contain the words “race” or “color.” See
infra text accompanying notes 318–319. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 subsequently did
refer to “citizens of every race and color.” Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875).
131. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
132. Id. (emphasis added). Apparently, the first draft of the bill had included the word “cover”
rather than “color.” See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1866) (Illinois Senator Lyman
Trumbull, sponsor of Civil Rights Act of 1866, noting that “the first amendment of the Committee
on the Judiciary was . . . to strike out the word ‘cover’ and to insert the word ‘color.’”). Presumably,
this was just a typographical error.
133. Ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
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and the races of men differ from the deepest jet up to the fairest of
lily white all over the world. 134
Senator Cowen seemed to view “race” as a particular group of humans and
“color” as their skin color. Interestingly, to further support his point, Senator
Cowan also referred to potential discrimination on the basis of hair texture:
If a [s]tate did not desire to make a distinction on account of race,
I suppose it might lawfully make a distinction on account of hair.
If it desired to single out any class of its citizens and subject them
to special laws, it would be a good description, and would not be
obnoxious to the terms of this bill, if it were to say that it should
apply to all persons whose hair was ribbon-shaped and curled naturally, and not to persons whose hair was cylindriform. 135
While both skin color and hair are used to identify race, “color” was deemed
important enough to include in the text of the Act. This was likely because
skin color was the visible feature that was most closely associated with race,
and perhaps also because the term “color” had often been used as a synonym
for race. 136
In other floor statements, color and race seemed to be interchangeable.
“Color” could have been a synonym for race, or it could have denoted skin
color as a defining feature of race. For example, Senator Garrett Davis stated
that “one short bill breaks down all the domestic systems of law . . . so far
not only as the negro, but as any man without regard to color is concerned.” 137
“Negro” is typically used as a racial term, but at that time, some formal classifications of color, such as those in the U.S. Census, used racial terms. 138
Senator Davis may have also viewed color as skin color: not race per se but
a defining physical feature of African Americans. Either way, color here was
not separable from race.
Similarly, Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland interpreted the Act to
mean “that no [s]tate shall discriminate . . . between any inhabitants . . . on

134. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866).
135. Id. Senator Cowan’s statement here is reminiscent of Hudgins v. Wright, where the court
believed that hair texture was even more indicative of race than skin color. See supra note 110.
Recently, several states have banned discrimination based on hairstyles and texture. See Ovetta
Wiggins, States Are Banning Discrimination Against Black Hairstyles. For Some Lawmakers, It’s
Personal., WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-bill-crown-act-hairstyles-discrimination/2020/03/12/c3b81582-5f05-11ea-b0144fafa866bb81_story.html. For more on hair-related race discrimination generally, see Paulette M.
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 40 DUKE L.J. 365
(1991); D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to
Do With It, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1356 (2008); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010).
136. See supra Section I.A.
137. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (1866).
138. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text.
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account of any race to which they may belong, whether white or black, on
account of color, if they are not white.” 139 Senator Johnson here seems to
denote color as a defining feature of race, but it is not clear whether the term
refers specifically to skin color or to race itself. Again, color is not separable
from race.
Throughout their discussions, the Framers of the 1866 Act typically
used the term “white person” to denote those people who already had full
citizenship rights. In contrast, they used a variety of terms to refer to African
Americans: “negro,” “black man,” “colored person,” “person of color,” and
“persons of African descent,” along with a few references to “mulatto.” 140
These different terms may have reflected various understandings of race, including the belief that skin color was often, even if not always, the defining
feature of race.
2. Reconstruction Amendments
After the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, the Fourteenth
Amendment enacted the broadest constitutional protections of citizenship
rights. 141 Although the Fourteenth Amendment did not contain the words
“race” or “color,” it is widely understood as an endeavor to constitutionalize
the 1866 Act. 142 Eventually, the Equal Protection Clause became the primary
vehicle in the Constitution to protect against these forms of discrimination.
The congressional debate on the Fourteenth Amendment shows that it
was intended to protect Black Americans against race and color discrimination. In the debate, there was still ambiguity around the meaning of “color”;
however, statements made during the floor debate illustrated the purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause. Pennsylvania Representative and Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens highlighted some of the protections the Clause
would provide:

139. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866).
140. See generally id.
141. The Equal Protection Clause became the primary means to protect against race and color
discrimination. Additionally, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the Citizenship
Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
142. See NELSON, supra note 126. Opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment questioned its
necessity in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and they feared it would allow interracial marriage.
See id. Proponents of the Amendment argued that since legislation could be repealed, a constitutional amendment would provide more stable protection of Black people’s rights and would put to
rest any doubt about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. The latter view
prevailed as the Amendment was ratified in 1868. Id.
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Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the
black man precisely in the same way and to the same degree.
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford “equal” protection to the black man. . . . Whatever law allows the white man to
testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the same. . . .
Now different degrees of punishment are inflicted, not on account
of the magnitude of the crime, but according to the color of the
skin. Now color disqualifies a man from testifying in courts, or
being tried in the same way as white men. 143
Representative Stevens appears to view “color of the skin” as a defining
feature of race. Other comments in the floor debate also illustrated the overlap between race and color and the ambiguous use of color-based terminology. Comments by New Jersey Representative A. J. Rogers, who opposed
the Fourteenth Amendment on grounds that it would allow interracial marriage, showed how common understandings of race fused notions of ancestry,
color, and purity:
A white citizen of any State may marry a white woman; but if a
black citizen goes into the same State he is entitled to the same
privileges and immunities that white citizens have, and therefore
under this amendment a negro might be allowed to marry a white
woman. I will not go for an amendment of the Constitution to give
a power so dangerous . . . as to run the pure white blood of the Anglo-Saxon people of the country into the black blood of the negro
or the copper blood of the Indian. 144
Here, Representative Rogers used color terminology metaphorically to refer
to racial ancestry—“black blood” and “copper blood.”
Debate over language in the Fifteenth Amendment, which sought to protect the right to vote, can also shed light on the meaning of “color” in the
Reconstruction laws. The Fifteenth Amendment is the only provision in the
U.S. Constitution that contains the terms “race” and “color.” 145 Section 1 of
the Amendment reads: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 146
Congressional floor debate about the Fifteenth Amendment contained
nuanced discussion of specific terms. For example, Michigan Senator Jacob
143. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
144. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 134 (1866).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
146. Id. (emphasis added). A strict textualist analysis of the Fifteenth Amendment suggests not
only that “race” and “color” have different meanings, but that this presumption is even stronger than
for the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Fifteenth Amendment states “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Id. The word “or” implies that all three are separate. Taken in historical context,
such a presumption could extend to other Reconstruction Era laws: if “color” is different from “race”
for the Fifteenth Amendment, then it should be different for other laws as well.
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Howard offered an amendment to the language to protect voting rights specifically for “citizens of African descent.” When asked to clarify what this
meant, he noted:
I mean by African descent what is popularly known as such. . . .
By one of “African descent” is understood a person who has African blood in his veins. . . . It designates what is commonly known
as the negro, or some person having colored blood in his veins to
the amount of at least one eighth. I believe it is settled by the courts
of justice that when the quantity becomes less than one eighth, in
law and in jurisprudence he is called a white man. 147
Representative John Bingham of Ohio, a Radical Republican, wanted to
add the terms “nativity,” “property,” and “creed” to the amendment because
some states, such as Rhode Island, discriminated on these bases. 148 Bingham
agreed with the terms “race,” “color,” and “previous condition of servitude,”
and noted that Ohio and twenty other states had constitutions which “unjustly
and wrongfully discriminate among citizens on account of color.” 149 Bingham’s remarks indicate that he had reached an understanding of the protections conferred by including “race,” “color,” and “nativity.” They also illustrate the level of nuance that went into determining the specific terms in the
Reconstruction laws. But it is still not clear that Bingham or others viewed
color as a characteristic that was separable from race.
As with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, debate over the Reconstruction
Amendments saw White people referred to as just as “white men” or “white
women,” while various terms were used to denote Black Americans: “negro,”
“black,” and others. Whiteness was the privileged status, and Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment aimed to extend the privileges of citizenship to
those who, on the basis of race or color, were deemed to be non-White. And
while the Reconstruction Framers were clear about this aim, they were varied
in their understanding about the relationship between race and color.
C. Why Both “Race” and “Color”?
The Reconstruction Framers vigorously debated the wording of civil
rights laws, considering which rights and classes needed enumerated protection. Some of their comments indicate that they equated race with ancestry. 150 They may have also viewed skin color separately from race, though
perhaps still as the defining feature of race. 151 Nevertheless, in their debates,

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1009 (1869).
Id. at 1426–27.
Id. at 1427.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 147.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139, 144.
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they often used the terms “race” and “color” interchangeably. 152 Ultimately,
the Framers of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fifteenth Amendment determined that “race” and “color” were two terms that were important
enough to include. But if the terms were essentially used interchangeably,
why include both of them? What did the “color” provision offer that the
“race” provision could not?
The floor debates do not provide a conclusive answer. But in the antebellum period, skin color often served as a proxy for race when evidence of
ancestry was not available.153 Many different understandings (and misunderstandings) of race emerged, reflected by the plethora of terms used by the
Reconstruction Framers to describe Black Americans—such as “black,”
“person of color,” “negro,” “African,” and “mulatto.” In contrast, the Framers only used “White” (or “white person” or “white man”) to describe White
Americans. Whiteness was a singular, privileged status. 154
The various terms used to refer to Black Americans could emphasize
ancestry or skin color. In the collective minds of the Reconstruction Framers,
the language of “race” and “color” together may have captured the different
ways to distinguish between “white persons” and others. For example, race
may have focused on ancestry155 and color on skin color. 156 Some of the
Framers may have distinguished between race and color, 157 but many seemed
to treat race and color as essentially the same. 158
Even those who understood that race and color were not the same could
use skin color as presumptive of race. Because skin color can be easily identified visually, it can become the basis for race discrimination. Race discrimination, based on visual perception of skin color, could then occur against a

152. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139, 144.
153. See Jones, supra note 9, at 1502–03 n.50 (noting that “[ancestry] information was not always available, given that accurate records were not kept and given the pervasive division of slave
families throughout the period of slavery”).
154. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. It may be noteworthy that in later litigation around the meaning of Whiteness, ancestry of the Petitioners was generally known, and the
issue was whether particular ethnic groups were considered “White.” See supra notes 99–100 and
accompanying text. Conversely, when courts determined Blackness and slave status, they had to
make assumptions about individuals’ ancestry—based in part on skin color. See supra text accompanying notes 101–118.
155. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 147.
156. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 143.
157. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 134, 143.
158. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 137, 139, 144.
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racially ambiguous person who appeared to be non-White, even if that person’s ancestry was unknown or contested. 159 “Color” provisions may have
captured this form of race discrimination. 160
The purpose of Reconstruction Era color protections was not to address
within-group discrimination by skin color, or discrimination by White Americans specifically against a racial subclass such as dark-skinned African
Americans. Rather, the Reconstruction Framers were concerned with discrimination against all “persons of color.” Some of the Framers may have
viewed “color” as distinct from “race,” but they did not view color discrimination as having a distinct target from race discrimination. Both forms of
discrimination targeted all African Americans. As the next Part illustrates,
this was also reflected in the Supreme Court’s initial rulings on the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. COLOR-CONSCIOUS
In early Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court considered the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Due Process
Clause, and Equal Protection Clause together. 161 The Slaughterhouse Cases 162 limited the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to those privileges or immunities linked to federal citizenship, not state

159. See supra Part II.A. In fact, light-skinned African Americans were more likely to be racially ambiguous, although they were still darker than most White people.
160. Dr. Paul Finkelman, eminent legal historian and current president of Gratz College, gave a
similar explanation for including both “race” and “color” in the text of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Dr. Finkelman notes two reasons: 1. “Race” in the Reconstruction Era often denoted national origin
or ethnicity (e.g., “German race,” “Chinese race,” “Jewish race”); 2. The Reconstruction Framers
realized that Southern states could claim that skin color discrimination was different than race discrimination and thus allowable. See Paul Finkelman, President, Gratz College, Clark v. Muscatine
Schools and the Historic Civil Rights Decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court, Clark 150 Conference:
Past, Present, and Future of Equality in Iowa (Sept. 28, 2018) (recording available at Drake University School of Law). Dr. Finkelman’s explanation occurs at 27:00 to 27:55 of this lecture. He notes,
at 27:00, that “somebody” asked him about the “apparent redundancy” with both “race” and “color”
in the text of the Fifteenth Amendment. “Somebody” referred to the author of this Article, as earlier
in the day, I had a conversation with him about the topic. Although framed in a different manner,
Dr. Finkelman’s insights echoed the intuitions I had developed as I was doing research for this
Article. See supra text accompanying notes 153–159.
161. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (“[E]nforced separation of the races . . .
neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Gabriel Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About
Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1374 (2008) (arguing that in early Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, “due process and equal protection claims were not distinct: they were two sides of
the same coin”).
162. 83 U.S. (1 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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citizenship. 163 Consequently, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
took on prominence, and the latter came to be the main provision to protect
against race and color discrimination.
This Part examines how the United States Supreme Court treated race
and color in its early equal protection jurisprudence. It considers nineteenthand early twentieth-century cases that involved the exclusion of Black Americans from jury service, which were the Court’s earliest statements on race
and color discrimination. It then looks at Plessy v. Ferguson 164 and other
major equal protection cases in the first half-century after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court
treated race and color discrimination as essentially the same—both forms of
discrimination against Black Americans. By the various ways it referred to
Black Americans, the Court seemed to view race and color as two ways of
designating the same group. Language by some of the Justices suggests that
they viewed color as a means to identify an individual’s race. But importantly, the Court also did not develop any color discrimination jurisprudence independent of its race discrimination jurisprudence.
A. Nineteenth-Century Jury Service Cases
During the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided several
cases which involved the exclusion of Black jurors. Through these opinions,
the Court notes that African Americans were discriminated against based on
both “race” and “color,” though the distinction between the two was still not
clear. Nevertheless, it is apparent that race and color provisions were equally
important and worked together to protect against racism.
Justice William Strong wrote the Court’s opinions in the first three of
these cases, which were decided in the same term. Strauder v. West Virginia 165 involved Taylor Strauder, a “very light mulatto,” 166 who was convicted
of murder by an all-white jury. Strauder challenged the exclusion of Black
163. Id. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court also stated that all of the Reconstruction
Amendments were intended to protect African Americans against race and color discrimination.
See id. at 71–72 (“It is true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by
speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.”). Ten years
later, the Civil Rights Cases also limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, ruling that it only
applied to state actors. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
164. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
165. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). For a more detailed analysis of the Strauder opinion, see Sanford
Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the
Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 603 (2018).
166. Horrible Murder, WHEELING DAILY INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 19, 1872, reprinted at Taylor
Strauder Case, W. VA. DEP’T ARTS, CULTURE & HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/history/africanamericans/strauder01.html (last visited June 10, 2020).
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jurors on equal protection grounds. Justice Strong’s opinion illustrates that
the Reconstruction Amendments protected against race and color discrimination:
If the defendant has a right to have a jury selected for the trial of
his case without discrimination against all persons of his race or
color, because of their race or color, the right, if not created, is protected by those [Reconstruction] amendments, and the legislation
of Congress under them. 167
Here, race and color appear to have equal legal effect: If either is used to
exclude jurors, then a defendant’s rights would be violated. Other language
in Strauder suggests that in this specific instance, Black jurors were excluded
“because of color alone”:
And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to
submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from
which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is
not a denial to him of equal legal protection? 168
The opinion goes on to state: “Concluding, therefore, that the statute of West
Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors, as it does, against negroes
because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws
to a colored man . . . .” 169 Twice, the Strauder Court notes that Black jurors
were excluded “because of [their] color alone.”170 One might infer that Justice Strong saw “color” as a defining feature of race—perhaps the means used
to identify race. 171
In Virginia v. Rives, 172 the issue was exclusion of Black jurors. Referencing Strauder, Justice Strong reiterated that the Equal Protection Clause
prevented race and color discrimination not only through legislation, but also
through the actions of state officials:
[A]s we endeavored to maintain in the case of Strauder v. West
Virginia, that discrimination by law against the colored race, because of their color, in the selection of jurors, is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to a negro when he is put upon trial for
an alleged criminal offence against a State, the laws of Virginia
167. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
168. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
170. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
171. Almost 140 years later, the Defendant-Appellant in Bridgeforth would argue that in a typical peremptory challenge and Batson case, jurors are dismissed upon observation of their skin color,
without formally classifying them by race. See infra text accompanying notes 380–386. This may
or may not have occurred in nineteenth-century jury service cases: Jurors could also have been
excluded ante exclusion from jury service rolls. Nevertheless, the language suggests that the Justices viewed “color” as the typical means to differentiate by race.
172. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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make no such discrimination. If, as was alleged in the argument,
though it does not appear in the petition or record, the officer to
whom was intrusted the selection of the persons from whom the
juries for the indictment and trial of the petitioners were drawn,
disregarding the statute of the State, confined his selection to white
persons, and refused to select any persons of the colored race,
solely because of their color, his action . . . . was the act of the
State, and was prohibited by the constitutional amendment. 173
Again, the Supreme Court’s language here suggests that skin color is typically the feature used to identify race. It twice notes that discrimination
against the “colored race” occurred “because of their color.” 174 Besides “colored race,” Justice Strong also used the term “negro” 175 to refer to African
Americans.
Justice Strong also wrote the opinion in Ex parte Virginia, 176 which also
dealt with the exclusion of Black jurors. Here, he did seem to differentiate
between race and color. He noted, “an officer charged by law with the selection of jurors . . . did then and there exclude and fail to select as grand and
petit jurors certain citizens . . . of African race and black color.” 177 This language suggests a distinction: Justice Strong viewed “African” as a racial
background (denoting ancestry) and “black” as skin color.
Other jury service cases show similar language trends. In Neal v. Delaware, 178 Justice Harlan framed the issues as “whether . . . citizens of the African race . . . were . . . excluded from service on juries because of their
color.” 179 Similarly, in Gibson v. Mississippi, 180 also written by Justice Harlan, the opinion refers to “exclusion of the black race from juries because of
their color was not less forbidden by law than would be the exclusion from
juries, in [s]tates where the blacks have the majority, or the white race because of their color.” 181 This opinion refers to the “African race” 182 and “African descent,” 183 and it uses the term “colored” in many places. 184 In these
opinions, only the term “White” was used for White Americans; conversely,
Black Americans were described in many different ways.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 321 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
100 U.S. 339 (1879).
Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
103 U.S. 370 (1880).
Id. at 387.
162 U.S. 565 (1896).
Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
Id. at 580.
Id. at 583–84.
See generally id.
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In all of these cases, race and color were of equal importance when describing discrimination against Black Americans, although the Supreme
Court did not appear to draw any legal distinctions between the two terms. 185
Importantly, nothing in these opinions privileges “race” over “color.” Equal
protection applied equally to both. 186
Language used in the opinions resembles that of the Reconstruction
Framers’ floor statements. The different Justices who wrote the opinions
used many different terms to describe Black Americans. This may again reflect various understandings of race, color, and the relationship between the
two. 187 Implicitly, the Court seemed to recognize that either “race” or “color”
could be the basis for discrimination against African Americans. The Justices
also seemed to suggest that skin color is often the means to identify and discriminate on the basis of “race” (perhaps denoting ancestry). The infamous
case of Plessy v. Ferguson 188 further illustrated this understanding of the relationship between race and color.
B. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
In addition to the jury cases, other well-known early equal protection
opinions use “race” and “color” in comparable ways. The tide of equal protection turned for the worse in Plessy v. Ferguson, where the infamous “separate but equal” doctrine originated and diminished civil rights protections
for African Americans. 189 Plessy’s distinction between race and color is also

185. Two other Harlan opinions replicated these different trends to one extent or another. In
Bush v. Kentucky, Justice Harlan also stated:
It is sufficient for this assignment to say that the motion was properly overruled, for the
reason, amongst others, that the grounds upon which it was rested do not clearly and
distinctly show that the officers who selected and summoned the petit jurors excluded
from the panel qualified citizens of African descent because of their race or color.
107 U.S. 110, 117 (1883) (emphasis omitted). In re Wood uses both “because of their race” and
“because of their color.” See generally 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
Jury service cases in the early twentieth century used these terms in similar fashion. See generally Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Rogers v.
Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
186. Another well-known equal protection case during this era was Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), which involved discrimination against Chinese Americans in the operation of laundries. Yick Wo only used the terms “race” and “color” in passing and did not contain the linguistic
patterns of the jury service cases. The Supreme Court may have viewed the case differently because
Chinese Americans rather than African Americans were the plaintiffs. Also, Professor Gabriel Chin
argues that Yick Wo was actually a due process case, and that it only used the language of equal
protection because at the time, it was conventional for courts to consider due process and equal
protection claims together. See Chin, supra note 161.
187. See supra note 154.
188. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
189. Id. (upholding separate railroad cars for Black and White passengers).
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vague, but language used by the Court still suggests the Justices viewed color
as the means of identifying race.
Justice Henry Billings Brown’s opinion states that “Plessy . . . was assigned by officers of the company to the coach used for the race to which he
belonged, but he insisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which
he did not belong.” 190 Homer Plessy appeared White: “[P]etitioner was seven
eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored
blood was not discernible in him . . . .” 191 Plessy was not and could not have
been identified as Black by his skin color. The case was pre-designed as a
test challenge to Louisiana’s law requiring segregation in railroad cars.192
When the Plessy majority rejected Homer Plessy’s Thirteenth Amendment claim, the Court stated explicitly that color is the means by which races
are distinguished:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored races––a distinction which is founded in the
color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as
white men are distinguished from the other race by color––has no
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude. 193
With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plessy Court opined:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of
things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. 194
The Plessy Court here contrasted “equality of the two races” with “a commingling of the two races,” but when referring to means of discrimination to
be abolished (or not, in this case), it referred to “distinctions based upon
color.” This may suggest the Justices believed that skin color typically identified a person’s race—although ironically, not for Homer Plessy. 195
190. Id. at 541.
191. Id.
192. See A Brief History of the Evolution of the Case, PLESSY & FERGUSON FOUND.,
http://www.plessyandferguson.org/history/ (last visited May 8, 2020) (“Every detail of Plessy’s
case was strategically planned . . . .”).
193. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
195. See supra text accompanying note 191. The terms “African,” “colored,” and “negro” are
also used in the Plessy opinion. Also, both “because of color” and “because of race” appear in the
opinion. See generally id. Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy seems to use race and color
interchangeably:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. . . . But . . . [o]ur
Constitution is color-blind . . . . The law regards man as man, and takes no account of . . .
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C. Early Twentieth-Century Cases
Early twentieth century cases show a similar pattern with respect to the
use of “race” and “color.” The Supreme Court did not make any distinction
between “race” and “color” discrimination, though some of its language suggests that the Justices viewed “color” as the primary means to identify race.
In Giles v. Harris, 196 a voting rights case, plaintiff Jackson Giles, “applied in
March, 1902, for registration as a voter, and was refused arbitrarily on the
ground of his color, together with large numbers of other duly qualified negroes, while all white men were registered.” 197 The group being discriminated against is described in race terms—“duly qualified negroes”—but the
means of discrimination is again described in terms of color—“refused arbitrarily on the ground of his color.” 198
In Buchanan v. Warley, 199 Justice William Rufus Day’s opinion, the Supreme Court struck down a Kentucky statute that restricted property owners
from selling their property based on the buyer’s race. 200 Although this ruling
was based on the Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause,
the Supreme Court noted “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes
enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored
man to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against him
solely because of color.” 201 The opinion also refers to “compulsory separation of the races on account of color.” 202 Again, “color” appears to be the
means to discriminate by race.
D. Racing Color
These early Fourteenth Amendment cases illustrate how the Supreme
Court treated “color” as an anti-discrimination provision in its equal protection jurisprudence. Three trends emerge from these cases:
1. Two Sides of a Coin
First, race and color were twin claims: two sides of a coin. The two
were considered together, and color claims did not just apply to a subclass
his color . . . . It is, therefore, to be regretted . . . that it is competent for a [s]tate to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In addition to “white race,” Justice Harlan uses the terms “colored
race,” “black race,” and “Chinese race” in his dissent. See generally id.
196. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
197. Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
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such as dark-skinned African Americans. In all of the opinions, the Supreme
Court’s use of “race” and “color” overlaps significantly, and the language
suggests that they were dual, equivalent provisions to protect against racial
discrimination (or not in many of these cases). Both race and color provisions
were intended to protect all African Americans (or all “persons of color”)
from race discrimination. Moreover, these provisions were equally important: The Court’s opinions did not privilege one over the other.
2. Different Shades of Black
Second, much like the Reconstruction Era floor debates, there are differences in how the Court refers to White and African Americans. In the
cases noted above, White Americans are simply described as “White”—save
one reference to “Caucasian” when describing Homer Plessy’s descent. 203
Conversely, the opinions use a variety of terms to refer to African Americans:
“negro,” “black,” and “colored.” 204 This again reflects the different understandings of Blackness and suggests that race and color anti-discrimination
protections together may have captured these various understandings.205
3. Equal but Not Separate
Third, although the Justices recognized color discrimination was as important as race discrimination, they did not separate the two in any meaningful way. The Court’s language acknowledges discrimination occurred “because of color” 206 or “because of their color” 207 or “on account of color.” 208
However, beyond these subtle allusions to color as the distinction between
races and the means to identify race, color discrimination simply meant race
discrimination, perhaps when accomplished via perception of skin color.
This may have reflected how the Justices thought about race, color, and the
relationship between the two. There continued to be different understandings
of race, some more closely correlated with skin color than others. And despite the attention it paid to both race and color in these early equal protection
cases, the Supreme Court never forged an independent jurisprudence around
color discrimination.
After Plessy, social distinctions based on color (that is, racial distinctions) were permissible under the law. Civil rights advocates would eventually turn the tide and successfully use the Equal Protection Clause to combat

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896).
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 173–175, 181–184, 197; supra note 195.
See supra note 154.
See supra text accompanying notes 168–169, 201.
See supra text accompanying notes 173–174, 179, 181; supra note 185.
See supra text accompanying notes 139, 149, 202.

916

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:881

race discrimination. But as this happened, “color” became subsumed by
“race” in equal protection jurisprudence—as the next Part will show.
IV. “COLORBLIND”
Beginning in mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to
broaden the scope of equal protection and strike down laws that discriminated
against African Americans. In academia, progressive scholars had begun debunking the concept of race as a biological entity and arguing that it was a
social construct. 209 Responding to the racist ideology of Nazi Germany, scientists also started to emphasize historical circumstances rather than genetic
differences as the basis for racial inequality. 210 The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund (“LDF”), led by Thurgood Marshall, employed these ideas to bring
challenges to de jure segregation—challenges that would eventually lead to
Brown v. Board of Education I (“Brown I”). 211 In this context, as World War
II progressed and ended, the Court began shifting away from stating that
equal protection violations occurred “because of color.” The Court’s shift
here may have reflected the diminished emphasis on physical differences in
defining race, 212 in favor of highlighting social inequalities. As this occurred
and in the aftermath, some opinions continued to use the term “color” in conjunction with race, but those which did so were often just quoting language
from earlier cases. 213 This Part will explore these trends and their implications.

209. See, e.g., ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN’S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE
(1942); MYRDAL, supra note 39.
210. See WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 138–39
(1996) (noting statements made by scientists “in response to the racially based policies of the Third
Reich.”).
211. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
212. See MYRDAL, supra note 39. Even before it became more progressive, the Supreme Court
sometimes espoused that race (at least with respect to Whiteness) was not a biological entity, but
one defined by common understanding. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209 (1923)
(“[T]he term ‘race’ . . . must be applied to a group of living persons now possessing in common the
requisite characteristics, not to groups of persons who are supposed to be or really are descended
from some remote, common ancestor . . . .”); id. at 211 (“The word ‘Caucasian’ . . . . includes not
only the Hindu but some of the Polynesians, (that is the Maori, Tahitians, Samoans, Hawaiians and
others), the Hamites of Africa, upon the ground of the Caucasic cast of their features, though in
color they range from brown to black.” (footnote omitted)).
213. It is important to note, however, that the Court has still often viewed skin color as the
defining feature of race. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (“It may well be,
for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that . . . skin color[] should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”). It is likely that by “certain ethnic groups and
in some communities,” the Court was referring to groups of Black people. At other times, the Court
has also noted that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race.” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000);
see also id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Ancestry surely can be a proxy for race, or a pretext
for invidious racial discrimination.”).
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A. Pre-Brown Cases
Several cases set the stage for Brown I. One landmark case for equal
protection jurisprudence came with Korematsu v. United States. 214 Although
Korematsu upheld the internment of Japanese Americans during World War
II, it was the first case where the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to
racial classifications. 215 Korematsu was about race, not color: the term
“color” does not appear anywhere in the Court’s opinion or in the dissents.
Perhaps the Justices linked “color” discrimination mainly to African Americans and thus did not consider it in Korematsu. 216 But the process of “eracing” (erasing) color from equal protection jurisprudence had begun.
The legal discourse on race and color changed further in the wake of
World War II, when there was a budding ethos to eliminate racial segregation. The NAACP LDF was founded in 1940, one year after Thurgood Marshall was named special counsel of the NAACP. 217 Marshall advocated for
a strategy which aimed to overturn the “separate but equal” doctrine, particularly in educational institutions, rather than seeking to equalize facilities.218
The NAACP Board of Directors endorsed Marshall’s integration strategy in
1948. 219 Part of this strategy was to show that skin color is not determinative
of race, 220 and that race itself is not a meaningful concept. 221

214. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
215. See id. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”).
216. “Color” appeared less in other equal protection cases involving Asian Americans. See
supra note 186 (regarding Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); see also Gong Lum v. Rice,
275 U.S. 78 (1927) (using terms “colored” and “persons of color” but not “color” by itself). Both
Yick Wo and Gong Lum involved Chinese Americans.
217. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987).
218. See TUSHNET, supra note 217, at 114 (“I had assumed that the NAACP really meant business about an all-out attack against segregation, especially in the public school system.” (quoting
Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall to Roy Wilkins (1947)).
219. Id. at 115.
220. See Brief for Amici Curiae at 17, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), 1952 WL 47260,
at *17–18 (arguing that “mature students of anthropology . . . have shown that no significance whatever can be attached to skin color alone”). Bolling was one of the companion cases to Brown v.
Board of Education.
221. See id. (arguing that “the concept of ‘race’, which has been thought to have a scientific
explanation . . . [has] been demonstrated by mature students of anthropology to be largely lacking
even such a foundation”). Part I of the amicus brief also differentiated between “ancestry” and “skin
color.” See id. at *5 (arguing that “[s]eparation of school children by skin color or ancestry has no
warrant in twentieth-century community experience, proper legislative purpose, or scientific understanding and is therefore a meaningless classification violative of the Fifth Amendment” (emphasis
added)). This language suggests that LDF differentiated between “race” (framed as ancestry) and
“color” (framed as skin color).

918

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:881

This was a successful legal strategy. In 1950, with Sweatt v. Painter 222
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 223 the Supreme Court respectively
struck down de jure segregation at the University of Texas Law School and
the University of Oklahoma Graduate School. Unlike Korematsu, both of
these cases had Black plaintiffs. But neither opinion used the term “color”
anywhere within its text. As framed in the Sweatt opinion, the two cases
“present[ed] different aspects of this general question: To what extent does
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit the power of
a state to distinguish between students of different races in professional and
graduate education in a state university?” 224
The Court’s answer, limited to the facts of each case, was that “the Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon
race.” 225 Whether it was the NAACP’s strategy, 226 the changing scientific
and social views of race, 227 or some other factor, there was a diminished emphasis on color.
B. Brown v. Board of Education I
LDF’s integration strategy peaked with Brown v. Board of Education I,
which struck down de jure segregation in public schools. 228 Chief Justice
Earl Warren’s unanimous opinion does not contain the term “color” anywhere in the main text; he only used the term “race.” 229 Footnote 13 of Brown
I poses the question of whether the Supreme Court can “permit an effective
gradual adjustment . . . from existing segregated systems to a system not
based on color distinctions.” 230 As part of its strategy to promote integration,
LDF argued that “color distinctions” were not a viable reason for segregation
and were not even the underlying motivation behind it. In his oral argument

222. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
223. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
224. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added). The Sweatt opinion only used the term “Negro”
to refer to African Americans: It had no references to “black,” “African,” or “colored.” See generally id.
225. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642. The McLaurin opinion used the term “colored,” but it used the
term “Negro” more frequently, and it did not use terms “black” or “African.” See generally id.
226. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 209.
228. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown v. Board of Education II, the Supreme Court ordered the
remedy to be implemented “with all deliberate speed[,]” thus extending the timeline for actual desegregation of schools. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
229. The Brown I opinion does use the terms “colored children” and “Negro.” 349 U.S. 294
(1955). The opinion does not use the term “African,” and it only uses “black” when quoting the
Slaughter-House cases and Strauder. Id. at 490 n.5.
230. Id. at 496 n.13 (emphasis added). This language may have been taken from Plessy. See
supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text.
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in Brown I, Thurgood Marshall rhetorically asked why African Americans
were subject to segregation. He answered:
It can’t be because of slavery in the past . . . . [i]t can’t be color
because there are Negroes as white as the drifted snow, with blue
eyes, and they are just as segregated . . . . [t]he only thing can
be . . . [Black Americans] shall be kept as near [slavery] as is possible. 231
Marshall’s goal here was to highlight the social meaning of segregation
while arguing that physical differences such as skin color were unimportant.
In fact, during the Jim Crow era, mixed-race individuals were classified as
“Black” or “colored” 232 and subject to segregation regardless of their skin
color: Homer Plessy was the hallmark example. 233 Some states, such as Mississippi, defined “persons of mixed blood and any appreciable amount of Negro blood” as “colored,” even if they were very light-skinned. 234
Consequently, addressing “color” discrimination specifically was not
central to LDF’s goal. Rather, Marshall argued that Plessy’s “separate but
equal” doctrine 235 was not reasonable because segregation itself created social distinctions, and these rather than physical differences were the cause of
racial inequality. 236 In Brown I and its other hallmark civil rights cases, LDF
brought facial challenges to segregationist policies, focusing on systemic exclusion by race, not on identification of individuals by skin color.
This was an important and effective strategy. Nevertheless, buried here
were the immediate manifestations of discrimination, such as racial profiling 237 and peremptory challenges to jurors, 238 which occur precisely through
visual observation of skin color and other physical differences.

231. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM 82–83 (1996) (citing ARGUMENT:
THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
TOPEKA, 1952–55, at 239–40 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969)) (emphasis added).
232. See STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18.
233. See supra Section III.B.
234. STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 18, at 237 (defining “colored” as “includ[ing] not only Negroes but persons of mixed blood having any appreciable amount of Negro
blood.” (citing Moreau v. Grandich, 75 So. 434 (1917))).
235. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
236. Cf. supra note 231 and accompanying text.
237. See infra Part VII.B.
238. See infra text accompanying notes 385–386.
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C. Post-Brown Cases
After Brown I, there was still “color” language in the Supreme Court’s
equal protection rulings, and even reference to skin color as a means to determine race. 239 In McLaughlin v. Florida, 240 the Court struck down, on equal
protection grounds, a Florida statute which criminalized cohabitation by unmarried interracial couples. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice William Douglas, which stated that he could not
conceive of a valid legislative purpose under our Constitution for
a state law which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of
whether his conduct is a criminal offense. . . . [A]ppellants were
convicted, fined, and imprisoned under a statute which made their
conduct criminal only because they were of different races. . . . [I]t
is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race
of the actor. 241
Justice Stewart’s opinion is significant here for two reasons. First, it
denotes “color of a person’s skin” as the “test” for race, thus referencing color
as the visual means to identify race. Justice Stewart may have underscored
this point in McLaughlin because one of the appellants’ claims was that the
Florida statute violated the Due Process Clause, due to its unconstitutionally
vague definition of race. 242 The appellants in McLaughlin also argued that
the method for ascertaining race in this case was physical appearance incommensurate with the statutory definition of race that is rooted in ancestry:
At the trial one of the arresting officers was permitted, over objection, to state his conclusion as to the race of each appellant based
on his observation of their physical appearance. Appellants claim
that the statutory definition is circular in that it provides no independent means of determining the race of a defendant’s ancestors
and that testimony based on appearance is impermissible because
not related to any objective standard. 243
The Supreme Court did not reach this due process claim, deciding the case
instead on broader equal protection grounds.

239. See supra note 213.
240. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
241. Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
242. Id. at 187 n.6. (majority opinion) (defining “Negro” to “include every person having oneeighth or more of African or negro blood.” (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.01(6)). McLaughlin
employed the range of terms used to refer to African Americans, as it dealt with a Florida statute
that contained these definitions. Id. (stating that “Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1.01(6) provides: ‘The words
“negro,” “colored,” “colored persons,” “mulatto” or “persons of color,” when applied to persons,
include every person having one-eighth or more of African or negro blood.’”).
243. Id. at 187–88 n.6.
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Second, Justice Stewart’s concurrence in McLaughlin was quoted by the
Supreme Court three years later in Chief Justice Earl Warren’s majority opinion in Loving v. Virginia, 244 when the Court struck down a Virginia statute
which outlawed interracial marriage. This quote was the only reference to
“color” in the Loving opinion. 245
These cases show that beginning around World War II, “color” was subsumed by “race” under equal protection doctrine. 246 This trend was visible
through the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Even within the
modern cases involving the exclusion of Black jurors—the very type of cases
where color had appeared frequently a century earlier—the term largely disappeared from the text of Supreme Court opinions.
D. Modern Jury Service Cases
Recent Supreme Court opinions involving racial exclusion from jury
service most clearly demonstrate the disappearance of color. These cases
contain very few references to “color,” even though “color” language was
used frequently in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century jury service

244. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications . . . be subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ . . . . [T]wo members of this Court have
already stated that they ‘cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color
of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.” (emphasis added) (quoting
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring))).
245. Ironically, Justice Stewart himself wrote a separate concurrence in Loving, where he quoted
a different part of his McLaughlin concurrence—a part that used the term “race” but not the term
“color.” See id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[I]t is simply not possible for a state law to be valid
under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.”
(emphasis added) (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 184, 198 (Stewart, J., concurring))). Perhaps
Justice Stewart recognized that skin color as a means to identify race was directly at play in
McLaughlin but was not always at play in Virginia statutes defining race—because race here was
defined in terms of ancestry rather than skin color. See id. at 5 n.4. (noting that under Virginia
Code section 20-54 (1960), “the term ‘white person’ shall apply only to such person as has no trace
whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood
of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white persons[,]” and under Virginia Code section 1-14 (1960), “[e]very person in whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a
colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be deemed an American
Indian; except that members of Indian tribes . . . having one fourth or more of Indian blood and less
than one sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians.”).
246. There was a similar pattern in Fifteenth Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court.
In Guinn v. United States, Chief Justice Edward Douglass White noted that the accusation was that
“certain election officers . . . conspired . . . to deprive certain negro citizens, on account of their race
and color, of a right to vote.” 238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915). Both “race” and “color” are used at several
places in the opinion. See generally id. Forty-five years later, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960), Justice Frankfurter’s opinion used only the term “race”: It did not use the term “color”
at all, although the Gomillion opinion did refer to “colored voters” and “colored citizens.” See
generally id.
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cases, 247 and even though skin color has often been the means used to identify
race when Black jurors are excluded.248 In Batson v. Kentucky, 249 the basis
for color-based challenge in People v. Bridgeforth, 250 the Court’s only reference to “color” is a quote from Strauder v. West Virginia. 251 Later, in Georgia v. McCollum, 252 Purkett v. Elem, 253 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 254 Johnson v.
California, 255 Miller-El v. Dretke, 256 Rice v. Collins, 257 Snyder v. Louisiana, 258 Rivera v. Illinois, 259 and Foster v. Chatman, 260 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed race-based Batson challenges without a single use of the term
“color” in any of the opinions. 261 In its most recent Batson case, Flowers v.
Mississippi, 262 the Court’s various opinions used the term “color” three times,
once quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and twice quoting Strauder. 263 In
contrast, the term “race” appeared 122 times in the Flowers opinions.264
E. “E-racing” Color
Color was thus “e-raced”: subsumed by race in equal protection cases.
Some of the Supreme Court’s later equal protection opinions have used the

247. See supra Section III.A.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 380–386.
249. 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also supra note 3.
250. 69 N.E.3d 611, 613–14 (N.Y. 2016); see also supra note 3.
251. Baston, 476 U.S. at 87 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879)).
252. 505 U.S. 42 (1992). The McCollum opinion did use the term “color of state law” but not
“color” as denoting a visual quality.
253. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
254. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
255. 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
256. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
257. 546 U.S. 333 (2006).
258. 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
259. 556 U.S. 148 (2009).
260. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
261. See generally supra notes 252–260. All of these opinions did use the term “race”—often
numerous times. Id. There were other opinions which used “color” sparingly or in a different
context. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (four uses of “color” or
“skin color” and thirty-six uses of “race”); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (two uses
of “skin color” and fifty uses of “race”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (eight uses of “color”
and eighty-one uses of “race”). Edmonson also used the term “color of state law” to denote the
appearance of authority, not race or skin color. See generally id.
262. 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
263. See id. at 2238–39.
264. See generally id.
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term “color,” but these opinions are generally just quoting prior cases. 265 Despite Justice Thurgood Marshall’s protestations, 266 the Supreme Court sometimes continued to espouse that skin color could be a proxy for race. 267 Nevertheless, because the Court recognized only racism and not colorism, “color”
had no independent meaning and largely disappeared in the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court “e-raced” color in another way: It adopted a “colorblind” ideology, rooted in an anticlassification view of civil rights. 268 Although race was still there, it became neutral and even antithetical to civil
rights. Color did not exist in equal protection doctrine, until it reemerged in
Bridgeforth. But while color became subsumed by race under equal protection, a different type of color-based anti-discrimination jurisprudence
emerged under modern civil rights statutes. As the next Part shows, this jurisprudence did focus specifically on colorism and distinguish it from racism.

265. See, e.g., supra notes 249–251 and accompanying text. Also, it is sometimes obvious the
use of “color” does not denote observation of skin color, but just a metaphor to denote race. See,
e.g., University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“The applicant . . . will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because
he was not the right color . . . .”); id. at 320 (“[W]hen a State’s distribution of benefits or imposition
of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person’s skin . . . .”). Bakke was a case involving
affirmative action in higher education: Universities typically determine an applicants’ race by selfidentification on an application, not by observing their skin color. Id.
266. During his years on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Marshall remained keen to
the distinction between race and skin color. He raised the point in the oral arguments for Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb. 481 U.S. 615 (1987). See Oral Argument at 38:39, 38:52, Shaare
Tefila
Congregation
v.
Cobb,
481
U.S.
615
(1987)
(No.
85-2156),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2156 (Justice Marshall noting that his father was “white with
blond hair and blue eyes[]” but that “[h]e was a Negro”). Here, Justice Marshall was reacting to
Respondent’s Counsel’s contention that “one obvious way . . . [to] identif[y] . . . a non-white person
would be by reference to immutable physical characteristics such as skin color.” Id. at 38:25.
Later, Justice Marshall noted that he “just never liked” using the term “Black.” Justice Marshall, on ‘Afro-American’: Yes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/17/us/justice-marshall-on-afro-american-yes.html.
Although he did use
“black” in some of his later opinions, Justice Marshall initially used “Negro” and then came to
prefer “Afro-American.” Id.
267. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (“It may well be, for certain ethnic
groups and in some communities, that . . . skin color[] should be treated as a surrogate for race under
an equal protection analysis.”).
268. There is a general debate over whether American civil rights law, including equal protection, should espouse an antisubordination view or an anticlassification view. See generally Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2003) (defining antisubordination as the view “that law
should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups,” and defining anticlassification as the view “that the government may not classify
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category”).
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V. “COLORABLE” CLAIMS
In modern civil rights law, color discrimination typically refers only to
bias targeting skin color. 269 Most often, this is framed as a within-group phenomenon: for example, light-skinned Black Americans discriminating
against dark-skinned Black Americans, or vice versa. 270 Such claims have
been recognized under civil rights statutes. Unlike early equal protection jurisprudence, color is separate from race in these modern claims. However,
color discrimination claims are only viable when race or national origin discrimination is not applicable. 271
This Part examines how modern color discrimination is legally defined
and differentiated from race discrimination. It considers the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects against employment discrimination and has been the vehicle for most modern color discrimination claims. It also examines how the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which is responsible for enforcement
of Title VII, has defined color discrimination and race discrimination. Subsequently, this Part looks at color discrimination cases under Title VII, as
well as the small number of color claims brought under other civil rights statutes.
A. Defining Modern Color Discrimination
Various civil rights statutes, many of which contain the terms “race” and
“color,” have been the primary vehicles for the development of modern color
discrimination claims. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains both terms,
right next to each other and separated by a comma, in Titles II, III, IV, VI,
VII, VIII, IX, and X. 272 This language may have been parroted from the
original version of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 273
“Color” was not defined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Arkansas Senator John Little McClellan asked his colleagues twice about the definition of
269. See, e.g., Baynes, supra note 9, at 133 (“A dark-skinned person of color is likely to encounter more discrimination than his/her light-skinned counterpart.” (footnote omitted)).
270. See WALKER, supra note 46, at 290 (noting that “[c]olorism . . . [is] preferential treatment
of same-race people based solely on their color”). But see Jones, supra note 9, at 1498–99 (“It is
important to note that colorism operates both intraracially and interracially.” (emphasis omitted)).
271. Banks, supra note 9, at 1727.
272. Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241. Only Titles I, V, and XI lack the terms “race” and “color.”
Id. Also, Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) states, in part: “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite . . . shall be imposed or applied . . . to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color . . . .” Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976)). Other civil rights laws also contained the terms “race” and
“color,” but these are the most well-known.
273. Ironically, Section 1981, the modern iteration of that Act, does not contain the language.
See infra text accompanying note 319.
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“color” within the bill. 274 Senator John Tower of Texas acknowledged that
“[t]he term is ambiguous” 275 and further stated that “we get into a real problem when we go into questions of color, religion, sex, or national origin.
There can be all sorts of discussions along those lines.” 276 Representative
Timothy Abernethy of Mississippi asked explicitly whether Title VII would
make it illegal for “an employer not to hire a person on the ground of race—
that is, color . . . because the skin of the applicant is too dark?” 277 Representative Abernethy also referred to intraracial discrimination, inquiring
whether the statute would apply “where light-skinned Negroes refuse to hire
Negroes of dark skin.” 278 Representative Emanuel Celler replied in the affirmative to both questions. 279
Professor Kate Sablosky Elengold notes that there was confusion in separating race from color and distinguishing between race discrimination and
color discrimination. 280 Ultimately, “color” was not defined in the statute,
perhaps because legislators felt that the principles underlying the statute
would allow courts or administrative agencies to determine its meaning. 281
After several cases involving color discrimination, 282 this is what happened.
Most skin color discrimination claims have occurred under Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination, 283 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has set forth the following definition:
[C]olor discrimination occurs when a person is discriminated
against based on the lightness, darkness, or other color characteristic of the person. Even though race and color clearly overlap,
they are not synonymous. Thus, color discrimination can occur
between persons of different races or ethnicities, or between persons of the same race or ethnicity. 284
The EEOC’s definition of race discrimination is broader: It can involve
not only skin color, but a number of different characteristics, including an-

274. 110 CONG. REC. 7772 (1964); see also Elengold, supra note 9, at 12–13.
275. 110 CONG. REC. 7772.
276. Id.
277. 110 CONG. REC. 2553 (1964); see also Elengold, supra note 9, at 14.
278. 110 CONG. REC. 2554.
279. Id.
280. Elengold, supra note 9, at 14–15.
281. Id. at 15.
282. See infra Part V.B.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
284. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-III
(2006) (footnotes omitted), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html#III.

926

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:881

cestry, physiognomy and appearance, culture, perception (that is, discrimination based on perceived, rather than actual, race), 285 and association (that is,
discrimination based on having interracial marriages, friendships, etc.). 286
The EEOC’s definitions of race and color discrimination are not binding
on the federal courts. 287 Nevertheless, courts have also adopted a narrow
view of color discrimination, treating it as subordinate to race discrimination. 288 Color discrimination is not a viable cause of action if intent to discriminate by race can be shown. 289 Additionally, “color” discrimination has
only been applied in situations where a particular color-based subgroup (e.g.,
dark-skinned African Americans) is targeted.
B. Modern Color Discrimination Claims
Under modern civil rights statutes, color discrimination has typically
come into play in two situations: (1) When the plaintiff’s race is ambiguous
and a national origin claim is not viable; and (2) If discrimination occurs only
against a member of a racial subclass, such as a dark-skinned African American. 290 Courts have recognized both intraracial color claims (for example, a
light-skinned Black defendant discriminating against a dark-skinned Black
plaintiff) and interracial color claims (for example, a White defendant discriminating against dark-skinned African Americans but not light-skinned
African Americans). Such color claims have been brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42, sections 1981 and 1982 of the United
States Code, and the Fair Housing Act. 291
1. Title VII
Most of the jurisprudence on color discrimination has occurred under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 292—specifically prohibition of employment discrimination under Title VII. Although Title VII covers both interracial and
intraracial discrimination, most Title VII color claims have been intraracial—
between members of the same racial group. 293 In Felix v. Marquez, 294 a 1981
case between two Puerto Rican citizens, the United States District Court for
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Kaili Moss, Black Hair(tage): Career Liability or Civil Rights Issue?, 25 WM. & MARY J.
RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 191, 209 (2018) (citing EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d
1018, 1022 (11th Cir. 2016)).
288. See infra Part V.B.
289. Banks, supra note 9, at 1727.
290. Id.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012).
292. Id. § 2000e–2000e-17.
293. See Banks, supra note 9, at 1711–12.
294. No. 78-2314, 1981 WL 275, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1981).
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the District of Columbia noted that the “case presents, for perhaps the first
time in a federal court, an allegation of color discrimination that is not subordinated to a more familiar claim of racial discrimination.” 295 In denying
the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Felix court recognized a
claim of color discrimination, 296 stating: “Color may be a rare claim, because
color is usually mixed with or subordinated to claims of race discrimination,
but considering the mixture of races and ancestral national origins in Puerto
Rico, color may be the most practical claim to present.” 297 Here, the court
acknowledges that color discrimination claims are often subsumed within
race discrimination claims—an observation that applies broadly to all laws
that include color. 298 Importantly though, the Felix court recognizes that
color discrimination claims can themselves be viable options, particularly
when race, national origin, and other statuses are undetermined or subservient to color.
Professor Cynthia Nance notes that more color claims have been
brought by dark-skinned plaintiffs of all races than by light-skinned plaintiffs. 299 In the federal district courts, there have been cases involving darkskinned plaintiffs from a variety of backgrounds: Hill v. Textron Automotive
Industries 300 (relatively dark-skinned White), Brack v. Shoney’s, Inc. 301
(Black), and Sidique v. University 302 and Munshi v. Alliant Techsystems,
Inc. 303 (Asian Indian). Nevertheless, one of the more widely cited Title VII
color cases involved a light-skinned plaintiff. In Walker v. Secretary of the
Treasury, IRS, 304 a light-skinned Black employee brought suit against her
dark-skinned Black supervisor. 305 The Walker court recognized a Title VII
color claim, contending that “statutes and case law repeatedly and distinctly
refer to race and color. . . . [and] Congress and the Supreme Court refer to
race and color in the same phrase,” both of which imply that race and color
are distinct. 306 Unlike the early equal protection cases, courts have distinguished between race and color discrimination in modern civil rights law.
295. Id. at *11.
296. Felix v. Marquez, No. 78-2314, 1980 WL 242, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 1980).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Nance, supra note 9, at 465.
300. 160 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.N.H. 2001).
301. 249 F. Supp. 2d 938 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
302. No. 02-365, 2003 WL 22290334, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2003).
303. No. CIV. 99-516PAMJGL, 2001 WL 1636494, at *1 (D. Minn. June 26, 2001). For other
Title VII color discrimination claims involving South Asian Americans, see Banks, supra note 77.
304. 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir. 1992).
305. Id. at 404–05.
306. Id. at 406 (emphasis omitted). More recently, Jones v. Jefferson Parish also recognized a
Title VII color discrimination claim by a light-skinned Black plaintiff against a dark-skinned Black
employer. No. 12-2191, 2013 WL 871539, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2013).
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Until recently, only federal district courts had explicitly recognized
color claims. 307 This changed in 2015, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruling in Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino
Plaza, L.L.C. 308 The plaintiff, a dark-skinned Black woman, was denied a
promotion to a managerial position. 309 The casino’s general manager and his
wife repeatedly told another employee that the plaintiff was “too black to do
various tasks at the casino.” 310 The general manager also stated that he would
not allow “a dark skinned black person [to] handle any money.” 311 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, largely because most
of the general managers at the casino were Black. 312 The Fifth Circuit reversed, noting that: (1) Recognition of color discrimination is “unequivocal”
in the text of Title VII; 313 and (2) the defendant’s statements were direct evidence of color discrimination. 314
Some Title VII color claims have also sometimes resulted in settlements. 315 However, courts have dismissed many color claims, 316 and Professor Taunya Lovell Banks argues that it is difficult for plaintiffs to prevail
even in those claims that are recognized. 317

307. Benjamin L. Riddle, “Too Black”: Waitress’s Claim of Color Bias Raises Novel Title VII
Claim, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/too-black-waitresss-claim-color-bias-raises-novel-title-vii-claim (“[T]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rul[ing] in Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, LLC . . . [was] the first time that a ‘color’
claim under Title VII succeeds as a separate and distinct claim from ‘race’ in Federal Court at the
appellate level . . . .”). Previously, the Seventh Circuit had noted in dicta that Title VI and Title VII
allow claims of color discrimination. See Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“Title VI, like Title VII, forbids discrimination on the basis of ‘color’ as well as on the basis of
‘race.’ Light-skinned blacks sometimes discriminate against dark-skinned blacks, and vice versa,
and either form of discrimination is literally color discrimination.”).
308. 778 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2015).
309. Id. at 474–75, 477 n.4.
310. Id. at 475.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 475 n.2.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 477.
315. EEOC v. Pioneer Hotel, Inc., Case No. 2:11-CV-01588-LRH-GWF (D. Nev. Apr. 28,
2015) (Notice of Settlement); EEOC v. Rugo Stone, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-00915-TSE-TCB (E.D. Va.
Mar. 6, 2012) (Consent Decree); EEOC v. Applebee’s Neighborhood Bar & Grill, Case No. 1:02CV-00829-CAM (N.D. Ga. July 10, 2003) (Consent Decree).
316. See Banks, supra note 9, at 1727.
317. Id.
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2. Section 1981
Section 1981 is derived from Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which was reenacted by the Enforcement Act of 1870. 318 Unlike the 1866
Act, the reenacted version does not contain the words “race” or “color,” but
rather states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other. 319
Section 1981 “lay largely dormant for nearly a century” but was revived during the Civil Rights era, in the late 1960s. 320
Professor Banks notes that the initial Section 1981 color claims involved
Latinx plaintiffs, 321 probably because they did not fit neatly into existing racial categories, 322 and because Section 1981, unlike Title VII, did not protect
against national origin discrimination.323 In the 1977 case of Vigil v. City of
Denver, 324 the United States District Court for the District of Colorado upheld
such a color claim, stating that “skin color may be a basis for discrimination”
against Mexican Americans, even though skin color varied widely within the
group. 325 Professor Banks analyzes how courts disallowed other color claims
by Latinx and Black plaintiffs, 326 usually recognizing such claims only when
the plaintiff’s race was ambiguous and color or ethnicity could serve as a
substitute. 327 According to Professor Banks, this served particularly to disadvantage Black plaintiffs. 328

318. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 596 n.1 (1988) (noting that Section 1981’s
“statutory ancestor” was the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
319. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
320. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 318, at 596 n.1.
321. Banks, supra note 9, at 1724–25.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1725.
324. No. 77-F-197, 1977 WL 41, at *1 (D. Colo. May 23, 1977).
325. Id. at *1; see also Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Eng’g, Inc., 597 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.
1979) (finding that “prejudice towards those of Mexican descent having a skin color not characteristically Caucasian must be said to be racial prejudice”).
326. Banks, supra note 9, at 1727.
327. Id.
328. See id. (citing Sere v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 628 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(disallowing Section 1981 color discrimination claim by Nigerian plaintiff), abrogated by Jordan v.
Whelan Sec. of Ill., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014)); see also Waller v. Int’l Harvester
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Nevertheless, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 329 the Supreme
Court noted that Section 1981 “reaches discrimination against an individual
‘because he or she is genetically part of [a] . . . physiognomically distinctive
sub-grouping of homo sapiens.’” 330 In Jordan v. Whelan Security of Illinois,
Inc., 331 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
cited Saint Francis College and recognized a Section 1981 color claim by a
light-skinned African-American plaintiff. 332 In doing so, the district court
abrogated its own earlier rulings which had not recognized similar claims. 333
3. Fair Housing Act
In Rodriguez v. Gattuso, 334 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois recognized color discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act 335 and section 1982. 336 The plaintiff, a dark-skinned Latino,
sought to rent an apartment from the defendant, but after the two met, defendant told him it was unavailable. The plaintiff’s wife, who was a lightskinned Latina, then met with the defendant, who told her the apartment was
available. However, upon learning that the plaintiff was her husband, the
defendant recanted and again claimed that the apartment was unavailable.
The Rodriguez court reasoned that “the very inclusion of ‘color’ as a separate
term in addition to ‘race’” 337 implied that color could be a separate, independent claim under the Fair Housing Act—even if “[m]ost often ‘race’ and
‘color’ discrimination are viewed as synonymous.” 338

Co., 578 F. Supp. 309, 314 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that “Section 1981 applies only to race discrimination, not to discrimination on the basis of color”), abrogated by Jordan v. Whelan Sec. of
Ill., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 746, 753 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
329. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
330. Id. at 613 (quoting Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986)).
331. 30 F. Supp. 3d 746 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
332. Id. at 753.
333. See supra note 328.
334. 795 F. Supp 860, 864 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
335. See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90–284, § 804, 82 Stat. 81, 83 (1968) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012)) (noting that it is unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent . . .
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin . . . [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . .
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”).
336. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
337. Rodriguez, 795 F. Supp. at 865.
338. Id.; see also Walker v. Sec’y of the Treasury, IRS, 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d,
953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir. 1992). For further discussion of Walker, see supra text accompanying notes
304–306.
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C. Separate but Not Equal
Color discrimination claims under modern civil rights statutes differ
from those in early equal protection claims in two basic ways. First, modern
color claims are separate: “color” means skin color, differentiated from race.
However, although they have an independent identity, modern color claims
are not on equal ground with race claims. Rather, they become applicable
only when race or national origin claims are not viable.
All of the color claims under modern civil rights statutes have involved
plaintiffs who belonged to one particular race-color subgroup (e.g., darkskinned African Americans). However, a different type of color claim
emerged from state equal protection in People v. Bridgeforth: a multiracial
color class claim which involved a group of individuals of different races.
The next Part examines Bridgeforth in depth.
VI. BRIDGING THE COLOR LINE
With its 2016 ruling in People v. Bridgeforth, 339 the New York Court of
Appeals became the first court to recognize color discrimination as a viable
basis for Batson challenges and the first court to recognize a multiracial color
class—a protected class of individuals from different racial backgrounds
based solely on the dark skin color of the members. 340 Bridgeforth revived
color in equal protection doctrine, albeit only under New York’s Constitution.
This Part examines the Bridgeforth ruling, highlighting the novel recognition of a multiracial color class. It first reviews New York’s Equal Protection Clause and Civil Rights Law Section 13, which were the laws at play in
Bridgeforth. Next, it gives the factual background to Bridgeforth. It then
highlights the State’s argument against the recognition of a multiracial color
class and Bridgeforth’s argument for such recognition. Finally, this Part examines the New York Court of Appeals ruling and its reasoning in siding
with Bridgeforth.
A. New York’s Equal Protection Clause and Civil Rights Law
Section 13
New York previously adopted Batson’s doctrine for the Equal Protection Clause of its State Constitution. 341 New York’s Equal Protection Clause
reads:

339. 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016).
340. Id. at 617.
341. People v. Luciano, 890 N.E.2d 214, 216–17 (N.Y. 2008); see also People v. Kern, 554
N.E.2d 1235, 1240–41 (N.Y. 1990).
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No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race,
color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his
or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation,
or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
state. 342
New York Civil Rights Law section 13 also explicitly lists both “race” and
“color” as a protected classes:
No citizen of the state possessing all other qualifications which are
or may be required or prescribed by law, shall be disqualified to
serve as a grand or petit juror in any court of this state on account
of race, creed, color, national origin or sex . . . . 343
Until Bridgeforth however, no case brought under these laws had focused on
color.
B. Factual Background to People v. Bridgeforth
Defendant-Appellant Joseph Bridgeforth (“Bridgeforth”) was a darkskinned African American who was charged with three counts of robbery344
and convicted by a jury at trial. During voir dire, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike a number of jurors, including four dark-skinned
African-American women 345 and one dark-skinned woman of South Asian
(Asian Indian) descent who the parties believed to be Guyanese.346 However,
the prosecutor did not move to strike all prospective jurors who were AfricanAmerican or Guyanese. 347 Bridgeforth raised a Batson challenge on grounds
that dark-skinned women (both African-American and Guyanese-American)
were being excluded. 348 The prosecutor could not remember why he excluded the Guyanese South Asian juror and ultimately did not give a reason.
However, he did argue that for the Batson class, defense counsel must “either . . . do Guyanese or African American, [counsel] can’t do black or skin
color.” 349 The trial judge agreed, denied Bridgeforth’s Batson challenge, and
allowed the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge. 350 The dark-skinned South
342. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
343. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 2009).
344. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 615.
345. Id. at 615.
346. Id. Approximately forty-four percent of the population of Guyana is of South Asian/Asian
Indian descent. See Guyana Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/guyana-population/ (last visited May 9, 2020). The juror in question,
however, was born in India. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 615.
347. Id. at 619 (Garcia, J., concurring). One of the African-American women was ultimately
seated, but four of them, along with the one South-Asian woman were excused. Id. at 620.
348. Id. at 615 (majority opinion).
349. Id.
350. Id.
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Asian juror was not seated. 351 Bridgeforth was convicted and appealed the
verdict, arguing that color is cognizable for Batson challenges under the New
York Constitution and Civil Rights Law Section 13. 352 After losing in the
Appellate Division, Bridgeforth then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
C. Recognition of a Multiracial Color Class
The operant question in People v. Bridgeforth was whether a multiracial
color class, composed of dark-skinned individuals from different racial backgrounds, is cognizable and protected under Batson’s prohibition on juror exclusion. 353 Previously, such a class had not been recognized: Color claims
under modern civil rights statutes had only involved plaintiffs representing
one racial group. 354 Bridgeforth was the first case in which a multiracial color
class was recognized.
1. State’s Argument
The People of the State of New York (“the State”) made various arguments to dispute Bridgeforth’s claim that dark-skinned individuals are a cognizable class. The State’s main argument was that one cannot create a cognizable class by “us[ing] a physical characteristic, by itself, to combine
distinct groups into a single ‘super group’ for the purposes of Batson’s first
step, the prima facie case.” 355 It further contended that the group of darkskinned women proffered by Bridgeforth consisted of “women of widely disparate backgrounds, national origins, or ethnicities, and different races.” 356
In contrast to Title VII color jurisprudence, where the courts have dismissed
color claims when race and national origin claims have been available, 357 the
State here argued that the disparate race and national origin backgrounds of

351. Id.
352. Id. at 616–17.
353. New York has incorporated Batson into its state law. See People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235,
1240–41 (N.Y. 1990).
354. The Second Circuit has held that Batson is applicable when jurors of different races are
excluded because of their race. See Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 298 (2d. Cir. 2005) (“It is indisputable that one venireperson cannot be excluded from a jury on account of race. A fortiori, several
venirepersons of different races cannot be excluded from a jury on account of race.”). See also id.
at 298 n.5 (citing cases which have allowed race-based Batson challenges based on exclusion of
jurors of different races). Nevertheless, these Batson challenges were not based on skin color.
355. Respondent Reply Brief to Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Ctr. for Law and
Equality at 4, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No. 207) [hereinafter Respondent
Reply to Amicus Brief].
356. Brief of Respondent at 44, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No. 207)
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent].
357. Banks, supra note 9, at 1727.
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the class, which rendered those claims unavailable, also precluded color
claims.
The State argued that a cognizable group must be “a recognizable, distinct class . . . defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor or factors.” 358 The State cited New York Court of Appeals rulings that have rejected “people of color,” 359 “non-whites,” 360 “minorities,” 361 and “individuals
with ethnic backgrounds” 362 as a cognizable classes, because these groups
lack “internal cohesion” and defined common interests, attitudes, and other
characteristics that can be classified together in a meaningful way. 363 In arguing that a color class would be similar, the State conceded that a single
racial or ethnic group, such as African Americans, East Indians, or Guyanese
could be a cognizable group. 364 Nevertheless, the State argued that recognition of a group based on color alone “presents intractable skin tone line-drawing problems.” 365 Such a group would be subjective because light-skinned
and dark-skinned are relative features rather than discrete groups, and individuals will disagree on whether a particular juror is light- or dark-skinned. 366
When responding to Bridgeforth’s contention that discrimination
against dark-skinned individuals is rampant and has a long history, the State
did not altogether deny the existence of colorism but rather pointed to lack of
evidence of it in the record. 367 Further, the State argued that the mere fact
that a group faces discrimination or is disadvantaged does not make the group
a cognizable class for Batson. 368 It gave other examples of groups that may

358. Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 53 (first quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 494 (1977), then quoting Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 296, 305–06 (1st Cir. 2010)).
359. Id. at 56 (citing Griffin v. Lewis, No. 2:11-CV-1358-JKS, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 146962,
at *15 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012)). Professor Kate Sablosky Elengold also criticizes the notion of
“people of color” as a cognizable class in civil rights litigation. See Elengold, supra note 9, at 1.
360. Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 56 (citing United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d
645, 649 (9th Cir. 1982), overruled in part by United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Daly, 573 F. Supp. 788, 792 (N.D. Tex. 1983); United States v.
Marcano, 508 F. Supp. 462, 469 (D.P.R. 1980)).
361. Id. (citing People v. Smith, 613 N.E.2d 539, 540 (N.Y. 1993)).
362. Id. (citing Griffin, No. 2:11-CV-1358-JKS, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 146962, at *14–15).
363. Id. at 56–57. But see supra note 354 (referencing federal cases where race-based Batson
challenges involving jurors of different races were allowed).
364. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 60 n.8.
365. Respondent Reply to Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 8.
366. Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 67–68.
367. Id. at 5 (arguing that “[d]efendant did not show and cannot show that all ‘dark-colored’
woman [sic] . . . constitute a distinct, clearly-defined class . . . that has been singled out for discrimination”).
368. Respondent Reply to Amicus Brief, supra note 355, at 6.
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face discrimination but were not recognized as cognizable, such as “overweight individuals,” 369 and “red-heads.” 370 Moreover, the State argued that
skin color is not “immutable”: Individuals’ skin color can change due to disease, sun exposure, use of skin lightening creams, and by other willful
means. 371 The State contended that because individuals can be “temporarily
rendered a particular skin tone or color . . . . [there are] obvious problems . . .[in] . . .defining the group.” 372
Additionally, the State argued that the term “color” in the New York
Constitution and Civil Rights Law section 13 is synonymous with race. 373 It
contended that courts analyzing Batson claims interpret terms like “black” to
denote race rather than color, and that when “people of color” and “of color”
are cognizable racial groups, these terms are referring to Black Americans or
Latinx Americans, not to skin color. 374
But the state did not answer the operant question: Why then are there
separate “race” and “color” protections in the New York’s Equal Protection
Clause and Civil Rights Law section 13? 375
2. Bridgeforth’s Argument
Bridgeforth’s argument first highlighted the long history of colorism as
discrimination against dark-skinned people. This argument was buttressed
by the amicus brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality
and others in support of Bridgeforth, assisted by attorneys from Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLC, which added more empirical support for discrimination against dark-skinned people. 376
Bridgeforth also argued that skin color alone can form a cognizable
class. Responding to the State’s arguments, Bridgeforth noted that African
Americans and women, both of whom are “indisputably cognizable
class[es],” also have “widely varied interests, attitudes, ideas, cultural traditions, religious beliefs, and experiences.” 377 Bridgeforth noted that “[t]he
Supreme Court’s definition of a cognizable class is ‘a recognizable, distinct

369. Id.; Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 61.
370. Brief of Respondent, supra note 356, at 50.
371. Id. at 68–69.
372. Id. at 66.
373. Id. at 64–65.
374. Id. at 63 (citing United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 2005) and
United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 238–41 (2d Cir. 2008)).
375. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
376. See generally Respondent Reply to Amicus Brief, supra note 355.
377. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 10, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y.
2016) (No. 207) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant].
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class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, written or as applied.’” 378 Further, even if a “common thread” was required to recognize a
cognizable class, Bridgeforth argued that “being the target of color-based discrimination is a powerful collective experience that transcends individual
ethnic groups.” 379
Additionally, Bridgeforth argued that Batson challenges are based on
visual discernment of race and thus truly based on color: “Batson challenges
are often based on lawyers’ and judges’ assumptions about prospective jurors’ races (as in this case), [and] parties and/or the court can disagree about
group membership, which can devolve into an extremely subjective determination by the court.” 380 Bridgeforth pointed to two New York cases: (1) People v. Chery, where the trial court did not move past Batson Step 1 because
one of two prospective jurors identified as “Black” did not appear to be “an
individual of African descent”; 381 and (2) People v. Chance, 382 where the trial
court did not believe that some jurors were African-American because their
skin color was “very light” and they “could ‘pass for White.’”383 Citing these,
Bridgeforth contended that “courts already resort to skin color to determine
whether jurors belong to a group that is the subject of a race-based Batson
challenge.” 384
Bridgeforth’s counsel, Ms. Tammy E. Linn, reiterated this point at oral
argument. When pressed by Judge Eugene M. Fahey that color is “not part
of the normal calculus in the Batson analysis,” Ms. Linn replied: “[C]olor is,
in general, used as a proxy for race in the normal race-based Batson challenge. . . . it’s part of the calculus that’s already applied. . . if you think about
jury selection, jurors aren’t being asked what race they are.” 385 Ms. Linn
further asserted that “federal courts are using color as well. . . . this is how
race-based challenges have been . . . applied.” 386

378. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
379. Id. at 14.
380. Id. at 19.
381. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 377, at 19.
382. 5 N.Y.S.3d 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
383. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 377, at 20.
384. Id.
385. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No.
207).
386. Id. at 5–6. This argument harks back to the early jury service cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause: Race discrimination against prospective jurors is occurring
“because of their color.” See supra Part III.A.1–2. But see supra note 171 (noting that in nineteenthcentury jury cases, it is not clear whether jurors were actually excluded by visual examination of
their skin color).
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D. New York Court of Appeals Opinion
In a unanimous opinion 387 authored by the late Justice Sheila AbdusSalaam, 388 the New York Court of Appeals held that color is cognizable for
Batson challenges. 389 The Court granted Bridgeforth a new trial and offered
five reasons for its holding.
The first reason was textual: “race” and “color” are separately enumerated in the New York Constitution and section 13 of the Civil Rights Law,
and this “indicates that ‘color’ is a distinct classification from ‘race.’” 390 Second, the Court acknowledged the long history of colorism, noting that “[d]iscrimination on the basis of one’s skin color—or colorism—has been well
researched and analyzed.” 391 To support this proposition, the Court cited
scholarly works by Professors Taunya Lovell Banks, Trina Jones, and Michael Hughes and Bradley R. Hertel. 392 Third, the Court noted the importance of jury service, which it deemed “a principal means of participation
in government . . . [and] an instrument of public justice.” 393 Fourth, the Court
distinguished color classes from “‘minorities’ in general.” 394 It described
“minorities” as “a category that includes a vast and varied group . . . that is
subject to change based on census and other demographic data.” 395 In contrast, the Court found that “[s]kin color is generally an immutable characteristic” that requires a much narrower showing to establish discrimination. 396
Finally, the Court addressed subjectivity and administrability of color

387. 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016). Justice Michael Garcia concurred on separate grounds and
did not agree with the Court that color should be cognizable for Batson. See id. at 620 (Garcia, J.,
concurring) (“[T]o hold that ‘skin color’ is a cognizable class for purposes of Batson. . . . [is] a
monumental ruling [that] should occur only after careful consideration . . . .”); see also infra note
424.
388. Sadly, less than four months after issuing the Bridgeforth decision, Justice Abdus-Salaam
passed away. See Mike Hayes, The Life and Tragic Death of the First Black Female Judge on New
York’s
Highest
Court,
BUZZFEEDNEWS
(Apr.
14,
2017,
6:57
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikehayes/the-life-and-tragic-death-of-sheila-abdus-salaam.
389. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 613–615.
390. Id. at 614 (“The separation of ‘race’ and ‘color’ in the [New York Constitution’s Equal
Protection] Clause indicates that ‘color’ is a distinct classification from ‘race.’ Similarly, section
13 of [New York’s] Civil Rights Law . . . lists ‘race’ and ‘color’ as distinct classes. . . . indicat[ing]
that ‘color’ is a separate and distinct classification from ‘race.’”).
391. Id.
392. Id.; see supra notes 9, 87 for the specific works cited. These works were referred to the
Court by the Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. Brief
for Amici Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of DefendantAppellant, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016) (No. 2012-07683).
393. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 614.
394. Id. at 615.
395. Id.
396. Id.
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claims. 397 It stated that trial courts can use the existing protocol for Batson
challenges to determine whether a particular group of individuals constitutes
a cognizable color class—whether they “share a similar skin color” 398—in
the same manner that such determinations are made for race, ethnicity, gender, and other classifications. 399
People v. Bridgeforth is the first modern equal protection case to recognize color discrimination, and the first equal protection case in any era to
recognize it as separate from race discrimination. It is also the first case under any civil rights law to recognize a cognizable class made up of individuals
of different races, linked solely by their skin color. Although limited to Batson challenges and to the State of New York, it opens up a conversation about
the future of color-based anti-discrimination law—an area with growing potential as America becomes more multiracial and racially fluid. As the next
Part lays out, Bridgeforth’s recognition of a cognizable, multiracial color
class can have significant implications for civil rights law.
VII. GIVING “COLOR” TO CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
As shown in Figure 2, People v. Bridgeforth bridges the gap between
Reconstruction Era laws and modern civil rights laws and expands the protections they provide against color discrimination. It separates skin color
from race, but not by limiting it to racial subclasses (e.g., dark-skinned African Americans). Rather, Bridgeforth allows discrimination based on skin
color to create a much larger protected class—one that transcends formal racial categories and can address discrimination more broadly.
Figure 2: Types of Color Discrimination Claims
Cause of Action
Protected Class
14th Amendment –
Racial Group
Equal Protection Clause
(e.g., African Americans)
Modern Civil Rights Statutes
Racial Subgroup (e.g., dark(e.g., Title VII)
skinned African Americans)
New York’s Equal Protection
Multiracial Group (e.g., darkClause § 13 (People v. Bridgeforth) skinned people of different races)
Multiracial color classes such as the one recognized in Bridgeforth can
be important in the future, as the American population becomes more racially
diverse and fluid and as discrimination crosses racial lines. Developing a
broader color-based anti-discrimination jurisprudence will add a valuable
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
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facet to civil rights law. To do so, civil rights advocates will need to develop
ways to collect data on color discrimination and develop legal strategies to
address it. This Part considers ways to accomplish that end.
A. America’s Changing Color Line
As the twenty-first century progresses, colorism and racism will intersect even more. America’s racial demographics are changing: Professor William Frey notes that for the first time in 2011, more children of color were
born in the United States than White children. 400 Professor Frey and many
others forecast that the United States will become a majority-minority nation
by the middle of the twenty-first century. 401 Latinx and Asian Americans,
along with people of mixed race, continue to add more variation to the color
line—including variation in skin color. Consequently, Professor Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva argues that colorism will become an even more significant aspect of American social hierarchy. 402
Additionally, racial classifications continue to be malleable. Census racial categories have always evolved over time, 403 and people from different
nationalities may experience changes in racial classification over their own

400. WILLIAM H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: HOW NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ARE
REMAKING AMERICA 1 (2015).
401. Id. at 1. See also DALE MAHARIDGE, THE COMING WHITE MINORITY: CALIFORNIA,
MULTICULTURALISM, AND AMERICA’S FUTURE (1996); SARAH CARR, SANDRA L. COLBY &
JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. POPULATION:
2014
TO
2060
(2015),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf; William H. Frey, The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045,
Census Projects, BROOKINGS INST.: THE AVENUE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects/. But see Jonathan W. Warren & France Winndance Twine, White Americans, the New Minority? Non-Blacks and the Ever-Expanding Boundaries of Whiteness, 28 J. BLACK STUD. 200, 202
(1997) (arguing that projections of majority-minority America are based on assumption that ‘White’
is fixed category and ignore pattern of assimilation of many American immigrant groups, who gradually position themselves as ‘White’ and distance themselves Black Americans).
402. See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 69, at 5 (arguing that “color gradations [in the U.S.] . . . will
become more salient factors of stratification”); see also Harris, supra note 9, at 54 (noting “the
possible effects on society and anti-discrimination law of a drift away from ancestry as an important
component of assigned race and towards a greater focus on color”). Professor Bonilla-Silva argues
that U.S. social hierarchy will come to resemble the color-based hierarchy in Latin American nations. See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 69, at 4. But see Christina Sue, An Assessment of the Latin
Americanization Thesis, 32 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1058, 1062 (2009) (noting that “some recent
evidence for both Mexican Americans and African Americans suggests that skin colour in the US
may actually be decreasing in significance”). Professor Sue’s contention here refers to specific
within-group color hierarchies, not the multiracial color hierarchy posited by Professor BonillaSilva. For an overview of race and color hierarchies in Latin America, see Hernandez, supra note
80.
403. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text.
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lifetimes. 404 The 2000 and 2010 Censuses allowed multiracial identification. 405 Increasing numbers of people are identifying with more than one
race, 406 and this makes it more difficult to track race discrimination.407
Individual racial identity itself is becoming more fluid. Growing numbers of racially ambiguous people do not fit neatly into existing categories. 408
Individuals are even changing their own racial identities. 409 Professor Carolyn Liebler and her colleagues find that almost 10 million Americans
changed their racial self-identification between the 2000 and 2010 Censuses. 410 These researchers also highlight the complexity of this pattern:
“People who change their race . . . are doing so in a wide variety of ways . . . .
[their] responses change from multiple races to a single race, from a single
race to multiple races, and from one single race to another.” 411 Others have
advocated eliminating racial classification and identification altogether, 412
404. See Harpalani, supra note 85, at 135–36 (noting how U.S. Census racial classification of
Asian Indian Americans changed from “Hindu” in 1960 to “White” in 1970 to “Asian Indian” in
1980).
405. NICHOLAS A. JONES & JUNGMIWHA BULLOCK, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE TWO OR
MORE RACES POPULATION: 2010 1 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br13.pdf.
406. Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Rich Morin & Mark Hugo Lopez, Multiracial in
America: Proud, Diverse and Growing in Numbers, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2015),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/06/11/multiracial-in-america/.
407. See TANYA KATERÍ HERNÁNDEZ, MULTIRACIALS AND CIVIL RIGHTS MIXED-RACE
STORIES OF DISCRIMINATION (2018); NATALIE MASUOKA, MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY AND RACIAL
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (2017); Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998); Lauren
Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with Equal Protection, 102 CAL.
L. REV. 1243 (2014).
408. See generally Harpalani, supra note 68.
409. See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Affirmative Action in the Era of Elective Race: Racial Commodification and the Promise of New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179 (2013); Nancy Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1333, 1335–36 (2016) (describing a student who identifies as
Native American on application based on one distant Native American ancestor as an “identity entrepreneur—someone who leverages his or her identity as a means of deriving social or economic
value”); Charles M. Blow, The Delusions of Rachel Dolezal, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/charles-blow-the-delusions-of-dolezal.html (noting
how the story of a woman who was born White but later began identifying herself as Black “has
sparked a national conversation about how race is constructed and enforced, to what extent it is
cultural and experiential, and whether it is mutable and adoptable”).
410. See Carolyn Liebler et al., America’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic Response Changes
Between Census 2000 and the 2010 Census, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 259 (2017); see also Carolyn Liebler,
et al., America’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic Response Changes Between Census 2000 and
the 2010 Census (Center for Admin. Records Research and Applications, Working Paper No. 201409, 2014) [hereinafter Carolyn Liebler, et. al., Working Paper].
411. Carolyn Liebler, et. al., Working Paper, supra note 410, at 39.
412. See, e.g., Complaint at 119, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of
Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 1:14-cv-14176-DJC) (seeking “permanent
injunction requiring Harvard to conduct all admissions in a manner that does not permit those engaged in the decisional process to be aware of or learn the race or ethnicity of any applicant for
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which could also thwart attempts to collect and analyze data on race discrimination. 413
In this context, formal racial categories can become less relevant, and
tangible characteristics such as skin color and other physical features can become more central to discrimination. A formalist approach to antidiscrimination law, emphasizing government racial classifications, fails to capture
many discriminatory acts and policies. To protect civil rights, advocates will
need to think about protected classes in a broader, more flexible manner: one
that matches the changing demographics of American society, and one that
captures everyday mechanisms of discrimination such as visual identification
by skin color. Bridgeforth’s multiracial color class can open the door for
civil rights advocates to do so.
B. “Darker than a Latte”
The advent of a racially ambiguous U.S. landscape means that discrimination will take new forms. In July 2018, Republican strategist Rick Wilson
commented that President Donald Trump’s core supporters wanted to deport
anyone who was “darker than a latte.” 414 Wilson’s comment portends how
animus and discrimination may play out in twenty-first-century America—
sometimes without any formal classification of race.
At times, racist rhetoric and policies are themselves transcending formal
racial categories. President Trump’s stark appeals to xenophobia have targeted a variety of groups—ranging from Muslims from various Middle Eastern and African countries to Mexican Americans and other Latinx Americans. 415 President Trump has scapegoated these groups to promote his
admission”); KENNETH PREWITT, WHAT IS “YOUR” RACE? THE CENSUS AND OUR FLAWED
EFFORTS TO CLASSIFY AMERICANS (2013) (arguing that questions about race should eventually be
eliminated from U.S. Census). But see Elise Boddie, A Damaging Bid to Censor Applications at
Harvard, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/opinion/harvard-affirmative-action-lawsuit.html (arguing that “bar[ring] colleges from being able to consider, learn
about or even become aware of an applicant’s race . . . . denies all of us chances to build bridges
across communities and to understand the lived realities of race in America”).
413. Even if the Census and other government agencies continue to collect race data, individuals
may choose not to identify by race, which would make race discrimination and racial inequality
more difficult to track.
414. Greg Price, Donald Trump’s Supporters “Want Anybody Darker Than a Latte Deported,”
(July
11,
2018,
12:16
PM),
Claims
Republican
Strategist,
NEWSWEEK
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-supporters-darker-latte-1018600.
415. See Erika Lee, Trump’s Xenophobia Is an American Tradition—But It Doesn’t Have to Be,
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/26/trumps-xenophobia-is-an-american-tradition-it-doesnt-have-be/ (“Trump may be
the most xenophobic American leader in United States history. From the effort to restrict immigrants from mostly Muslim countries and the drastic reduction in refugee admissions, to efforts to
build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border and the denial of asylum seekers from Central America,
Trump’s policies have transformed immigration to the United States.”). Most recently, Trump has
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administration’s policies on immigration and national security. Members of
each of these groups may vary in their racial or national origin classifications,
and sometimes the government jointly classifies them with other groups that
are not targeted. Latinx can self-identify as “White” or “Black,” as the Census asks a separate question about “Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin.” 416
With all of these groups, various forms of discrimination can transcend
formal racial classification. Skin color and other physical features can often
be a means to identify members of these groups and distinguish them from
White Americans of European descent. If law enforcement officials target
these groups by discrimination based on appearance, color-based protections
could be a valuable tool to address such discrimination.
Racial profiling of Black men by police officers, a practice with long
historical roots, 417 provides another example where color-based protections
may be useful under certain circumstances. Such profiling often involves
identifying race via skin color, in a manner similar to the peremptory challenges in Bridgeforth. If police officers target Black males, the officers typically identify who is Black through visible features, including skin color.
The officers do not know if these men self-identify as “Black” and do not
have information about their ancestry. In the absence of other social or visual
cues to identify race, police officers may be less likely to target very lightskinned Black people who can “pass” for White. Police officers may also
target dark-skinned people who are not Black but are perceived as Black.
Once such case that garnered national attention occurred in 2015 in Madison,
Alabama. 418 Police officers beat and severely injured Sureshbhai Patel, a

scapegoated Asian Americans over the spread of novel coronavirus pandemic. See Ted Lieu, Ted
Lieu: Trump Is Stoking Xenophobic Panic in a Time of Crisis, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2020, 6:48
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ted-lieu-trump-is-stoking-xenophobic-panic-in-atime-of-crisis/2020/03/18/91433600-6959-11ea-b313-df458622c2cc_story.html (“Trump’s repeated insistence on calling coronavirus the ‘Chinese virus’ is more than just xenophobic; it causes
harm both to Asian Americans and to the White House’s response to this life-threatening pandemic.”).
416. 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/index_of_questions/2010.html (last visited May 10, 2020). For the 2020 Census, the Census
Bureau considered adding a separate racial category for Latinx, but this was ultimately rejected.
See Hansi Lo Wang, 2020 Census To Keep Racial, Ethnic Categories Used In 2010, NPR (Jan. 26,
2018, 7:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/26/580865378/census-request-suggests-no-raceethnicity-data-changes-in-2020-experts-say. Professor Tanya Katerí Hernández argues that separate Latinx racial category would reduce the number of Latinx who identify as “Black” and thus
undermine data collection on racism. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Latino Anti-Black Bias and the
Census Categorization of Latinos, NEWMAN FERRARA LLP (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nyrealestatelawblog.com/manhattan-litigation-blog/2017/december/latino-anti-black-bias-/. This underscores the importance of tracking skin color discrimination separately. See infra Part VII.C.2.
417. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ET AL., POLICING THE BLACK MAN (2018).
418. See Peter Holley, Abby Phillip & Abby Ohlheiser, Alabama Police Officer Arrested After
Indian Grandfather Left Partially Paralyzed, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015, 7:19 AM),
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fifty-seven-year-old Asian Indian immigrant grandfather who had only been
in the United States for one week, after a suspicious caller identified him as
“a skinny [B]lack guy.” 419
In this vein, the absence of color-based protections could enable racial
discrimination by proxy—on the basis of skin color. If color is not a protected class, prosecutors like the one in Bridgeforth and police officers such
as those in the Patel case could use skin color to effectively discriminate by
race. Addressing these and other issues of color discrimination will be difficult, given the current legal and political climate in America. 420 Nevertheless, the final two Sections propose ways to begin this process.
C. Measuring the Color Line
The collection of data on skin color discrimination is a key first step for
civil rights advocates. 421 Measurement and analysis of color discrimination
presents many challenges. Since Bridgeforth became law in New York,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/11/alabama-cops-leave-a-grandfather-partially-paralyzed-after-frisk-goes-awry/.
419. Id. The Patel case also illustrates the continuing significance of Black-White racial hierarchy in many circumstances, as Patel was profiled because he was perceived as Black. See
Harpalani, supra note 85, at 182 (“W]hile the demographics and dynamics of racialization in America have become increasingly complex, the black-white paradigm of American race relations still
has salience, even for groups who do not fit into ‘black’ or ‘white’ formal categories.”).
420. See Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Handed Down a Unanimous Decision That Bodes
Ill for the Future of Civil Rights, VOX (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/25/21192320/supreme-court-comcast-decision-civil-rights-mixedmotive-lawsuits (“[The] future bodes ill for anyone who cares about victims of discrimination.”).
421. The EEOC has listed data collection and analysis as a main goal of its Eradicating Racism
and Colorism from Employment (E-RACE) Initiative. See E-RACE Goals and Objectives, U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/erace/goals.cfm#goal3 (last visited May 10, 2020).
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questions have been raised about the administrability of color discrimination
claims. 422 As stated in People v. Ortega: 423
The difficulties . . . in assessing skin color . . . will be of a different
character than . . . race or ethnicity. With race or ethnicity . . . it
may be difficult in some cases to discern whether a juror is AfricanAmerican or Hispanic. But there are at least agreed-upon questions. The issue of whether someone has a sufficiently dark (or
light) skin color . . . may not be so simple. 424
Ortega further noted that “courts may need new tools and training to adequately address such issues. . . . To fulfill the aspirations of Bridgeforth, we
may all need to think in new ways.” 425
Administrability concerns about skin color arise in part from a lack of
formal categories. Unlike race, skin color is not formally classified by the
government. 426 U.S. Census forms once included “color or race” categories
determined by enumerators, 427 but the Census now uses self-identification of
race. 428 There are no formal government skin color categories such as “lightskinned” and “dark-skinned”: These terms reflect only subjective informal
assessments that vary among individuals. Consequently, there is much less

422. See People v. Ortega, 62 N.Y.S.3d 879, 880 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (“The rationale for the
Bridgeforth decision is compelling. How trial courts will be able to practically assess whether a
party is discriminating . . . by virtue of ‘similar skin color, for example, dark-colored’ is less clear.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611, 615 (N.Y. 2016)). The Ortega
court held that:
[A] class . . . [which] consisted of persons of African American, Hispanic or Middle Eastern decent [sic], with the possible additional qualification that such persons had skin tones
darker than a Caucasian and the additional provisos that the class likely included Indians
(but not Asians) and that persons of Middle Eastern descent were African. . . . does not
constitute a cognizable class under Batson.
Id. at 884. Conversely, the appellate court in People v. Pescara affirmed Bridgeforth’s recognition
of skin color for Batson challenges. 79 N.Y.S.3d 827, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). This case involved peremptory strike of a dark-skinned juror (described as “black”) whose race was disputed:
The defense claimed he was “African American” and the prosecutor claimed he was “Caribbean.”
Id.
423. 62 N.Y.S.3d 879 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017).
424. Id. at 886; see also Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 621 (Garcia, J., concurring) (“[T]he only
‘guidance’ offered to trial courts is that they should somehow ‘decide whether the individuals identified . . . share a similar skin color’ . . . [which] supplies little concrete or practical instruction for
lower courts tasked with creating a record that allows for meaningful appellate review.” (quoting
id. at 615 (majority opinion))).
425. Ortega, 62 N.Y.S.3d at 886. Another aspect about skin color discrimination claims that
may have implications for enforcement is whether a judge or jury decides if there has been discrimination. For Batson challenges, it is the former; however, for Title VII and other statutory claims,
it would be the latter if a case goes to trial.
426. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 24–36. Even when the Census collected “color” data, this did not correspond to skin color itself, but rather to race. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text.
428. See Index of Questions, supra note 30.
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data on skin color discrimination than on race discrimination. 429 Such data
exist only when social science studies have collected them. 430
Most social science studies of colorism to date have used subjective ratings by researchers to determine skin color. 431 These ratings have been based
on options such as “light,” “medium,” and “dark.” 432 Some studies have also
included self ratings of skin color by subjects. 433 Concerns echoed by the
Ortega Court 434 also resonate in these studies. Many of them did not provide
a baseline visual inventory of skin color for the raters to use as a reference
point. 435 Also, these studies generally have not reported how reliable and
consistent these ratings are across different raters. 436 There is evidence that
biases affect subjective assessments of skin color. 437 Even when there is a
visual skin color inventory as a reference point, researcher ratings of skin
color may be unreliable. 438
429. See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 86, at 5 (noting that “there is no data set that includes systematic data on the skin tone of all Americans”).
430. See supra notes 87–91.
431. See, e.g., Goldsmith, Hamilton & Darity, supra note 89; Hughes & Hertel, supra note 87;
Keith & Herring, supra note 90.
432. See supra note 431.
433. See, e.g., Fegley et al., supra note 10; Monk, Costs of Skin Color, supra note 91.
434. See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
435. See, e.g., supra note 431. One such visual inventory that has been used recently is the
Massey-Martin Scale. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & JENNIFER A. MARTIN, NEW IMMIGRANT
SURVEY SKIN COLOR SCALE (2003), https://nis.princeton.edu/downloads/nis-skin-color-scale.pdf.
This scale has been used in General Social Survey’s 2010-14 panel. See Lance Hannon & Robert
Defina, Reliability Concerns in Measuring Respondent Skin Tone by Interviewer Observation, 80
PUB. OPINION Q. 534, 534 (2016) [hereinafter Hannon & Defina, Reliability Concerns]. The 2012
and 2016 American National Election Studies time series data collections also used the MasseyMartin Scale. See Lance Hannon & Robert Defina, The Reliability of Same‑Race and Cross‑Race
Skin Tone Judgments, RACE & SOC. PROBS. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12552-020-09282-4#citeas [hereinafter Hannon & Defina, Skin Tone Judgements]. Another visual inventory for assessing skin color is described by Dr. Fegley and her coauthors. Fegley et al., supra note 10, at 297 (discussing the Visual Inventory for Skin Color Assessment (“VISTA”): “a commercially produced, glossy-finished, 15-inch color bar . . . comprised
of 10 colors arrayed across the bar from lightest to darkest. . . . selected . . . from a wide range of
human skin-tone colors”).
436. See supra notes 87–91. An exception here is Professors Shervin Assari and Cleopatra
Howard Caldwell, who report that in their study, self-ratings and interviewer ratings of skin color
had a correlation of 0.8. Shervin Assari & Cleopatra Howard Caldwell, Darker Skin Tone Increases
Perceived Discrimination Among Male but Not Female Caribbean Black Youth, 4 CHILD. 107, 110
(2017). Additionally, Professor Uzogara et al.’s study reports discrepancies between interviewerrated and self-rated skin tones. Uzogara et al., supra note 45, at 208–209.
437. See Denia Garcia & Maria Abascal, Colored Perceptions Racially Distinctive Names and
Assessments of Skin Color, 60 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 420, 420 (2016) (finding that “skin color ratings
are affected by the presence of a racially distinctive name: A significant share of people will rate
the same face darker when that face is assigned a distinctively Hispanic name as opposed to a nonHispanic name.”).
438. See Hannon & Defina, Reliability Concerns, supra note 435, at 534 (“Despite the widespread use of the Massey-Martin scale to investigate potential effects of skin tone on social attitudes
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More objective data on skin color discrimination may also be collected
via photographs, 439 and some studies of race and color bias in criminal sentencing have employed this method. 440 Additionally, quantitative measurements of skin color can be conducted with a spectrophotometer, which can
measure wavelengths of light reflected from skin. 441 Various studies of colorism and skin color bias have used these as well. 442
and outcomes, the data suggest that the measure has low intercoder reliability.”); Hannon & Defina,
Skin Tone Judgments, supra note 435 (“We strongly recommend that researchers and survey organizations seek alternate measurements of respondent skin tone that do not rely on humans memorizing subtle variations in color. In theory, the strategy of having respondents self-rate with an
abridged color guide is a straightforward alternative, but evidence on the reliability of self-ratings
is currently lacking.”).
439. Cf. People v. Ortega, 62 N.Y.S.3d 879, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (“No one has proposed,
for example, that photographs be taken when skin color Batson challenges are made.”).
440. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhart et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of
Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 384 (2006) (using
photographs of Black capital defendants in study of bias based on “stereotypicality of . . . Black
defendant’s appearance . . . [based on] features [such as] . . . lips, nose, hair texture, [and] skin
tone”). Professor Eberhart et al. found that “the more stereotypically Black a defendant is perceived
to be, the more likely that person is to be sentenced to death” in a mock sentencing experiment. Id.
at 383. Other studies have yielded similar findings. See Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut,
Looking Criminal and the Presumption of Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone,
and Criminal Justice, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 745, 775–85 (2018) (reviewing empirical studies of
relationship between dark skin tone, Afrocentric facial features, and length of criminal sentences);
Irene Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 674, 677 (2004) (finding relationship between more Afrocentric features and longer criminal
sentences). Some studies have found that darker skin is associated with harsher punishment even
for White defendants. See, e.g., Ryan D. King & Brian D. Johnson, A Punishing Look: Skin Tone
and Afrocentric Features in the Halls of Justice, 122 AM. J. SOC. 90, 90 (2016) (finding that “darker
skin tone and Afrocentric facial features are associated with harsher [criminal] sanctions and that
the latter effect is particularly salient for white defendants”).
441. See Edward A. Edwards & S. Quimby Duntley, The Pigments and Color of Living Human
Skin, 65 AM. J. ANATOMY 1 (1939); ELLI ANGELOPOULOU, THE REFLECTANCE SPECTRUM OF
HUMAN SKIN TONE (Univ. of Pa. Dep’t of Comput. and Info. Sci. Technical Report No. MS-CIS99-29, 1999).
In the cosmetics industry, spectrophotometers have been used to measure skin color, for the
purpose of matching it with makeup. See Marissa A., Spectrophotometers Help Cosmetic Brands
Create More Diverse Foundation Shades, HUNTERLAB (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.hunterlab.com/blog/color-pharmaceuticals/spectrophotometers-help-cosmetic-brands-create-more-diverse-foundation-shades/; EasyMatchQC, HUNTERLAB, https://www.hunterlab.com/easymatchqc.html (last visited May 11, 2020). Relatedly, Dr. Thomas Fitzpatrick developed the Fitzpatrick
Scale to measure the amount of melanin in skin after exposure to sunlight. See The Fitzpatrick
Scale, DERMA HEALTH SKIN & LASER (Nov. 2, 2017), https://dermahealthinstitute.com/blog/thefitzpatrick-scale/. The Fitzpatrick Scale is not a measure of skin color per se, but rather of “skin’s
reactivity to the sun when exposed.” Id.
442. See, e.g., Branigan et al., Skin Color, Sex, and Educational Attainment, supra note 88;
Branigan et al., Shifting Salience of Skin Color, supra note 88; Branigan et al., supra note 91; Sweet
et al., supra note 90; Mara Ostfeld & Nicole Yadon, Mejorando La Raza?: The Political Undertones
of Latinos’ Skin Color in the U.S. (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Nicole Yadon &
Mara Ostfeld, Shades of Privilege: The Relationship Between Skin Color and Political Attitudes
Among White Americans (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). But see Monk,
Cost of Skin Color, supra note 91, at 409 (“Many studies use spectrophotometers to ‘objectively’
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If these methods can be used reliably and efficiently to collect data, they
could prove useful for assessing color discrimination on a large scale. Data
on colorism will be necessary in the creation of multiracial color classes,
which by definition require aggregation of discriminatory acts against multiple individuals. It is only with such data that civil rights advocates can expand the scope of color-based antidiscrimination law.
D. Erasing the Color Line
Once there is sufficient data on color discrimination, the major challenge will be the incorporation of protected multiracial color classes into existing legal frameworks or new frameworks. Civil rights advocates will need
to develop innovative legal strategies to bring forth multiracial color class
claims. This will be a long, arduous task—but if successful, it would parallel
some of the most significant civil rights victories in America. 443
Two challenges that civil rights advocates will confront are devising legal frameworks to further develop color discrimination law and finding venues to bring cases to develop that law. Implicit bias is one area to explore for
the former, and state civil rights law could be a guide for the latter.
1. Potential Legal Frameworks
By combining data on skin color discrimination and state civil rights
law, advocates may be able to draw upon and expand existing legal frameworks to address skin color discrimination. Statistical analyses with large
data sets could help drive pattern-or-practice cases, similar to those that have
been used in Title VII employment discrimination claims. 444 Additionally,
statistical evidence can give rise to disparate impact claims under Title VII. 445
Data on color discrimination could allow claims to be brought under Title
VII itself, or under state civil rights laws which use pattern-or-practice or
disparate impact claims as models.

measure respondents’ skin tone. In these studies, researchers typically measure the skin reflectance
of respondents’ inner arms. . . . As research demonstrates, however, social classification . . . and
ethnoracial discrimination related to skin tone, in particular, are both related to the perception of the
lightness or darkness of faces, not inner arms (which, due to differential exposure to the sun, among
other factors, may not even be the same shade as individuals’ faces).” (citations omitted)).
443. See supra note 217; see infra notes 467–468. Of course, even such victories are far from
complete. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1989); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM (1992).
444. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977). Pattern-or-practice claims are
also available under other modern civil rights laws. See generally A Pattern or Practice of Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/pattern-or-practice-discrimination.
445. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Following Bridgeforth’s lead, Batson challenges may also be the best
venue to expand the recognition of protected color classes in the realm of
equal protection. Bridgeforth did not require any data collection: 446 The case
emerged from a specific pattern of juror exclusion. While such patterns may
be uncommon, Bridgeforth does provide persuasive authority for other state
courts when similar fact patterns do arise. 447 Moreover, if color-based protections are recognized for Batson, it follows logically that they should be
recognized for equal protection more generally. A sympathetic court might
extend color-based anti-discrimination to other areas, based on Bridgeforth
and other states that follow the decision.
Nevertheless, color-based equal protection will have to grapple with
some of the same doctrinal constraints that have impeded race-based equal
protection. A major hurdle has been proof of intent to discriminate—a requirement for equal protection claims, 448 and a very difficult standard to meet
in most cases. 449 It is no coincidence that modern color-based equal protection arose in a case involving Batson challenges, the one area of equal protection where direct evidence (or strong circumstantial evidence) is not necessary for a viable claim. Batson challenges are a unique branch of equal
protection: They create presumptions of intent if certain criteria are met,
shifting the burden to prosecutors to rebut such a presumption. 450 Beyond
Batson and other rebuttable presumptions of intent, civil rights advocates will
need novel legal frameworks.
One proposed means to address the intent doctrine is use of research on
implicit bias: “attitudes or stereotypes that affect . . . understanding, actions,
and decisions in an unconscious manner.” 451 Legal scholars and advocates
446. Social science data were cited in the Bridgeforth opinion. See supra note 392 and accompanying text. However, such data was not used for an element of the claim itself.
447. See Margolis, supra note 11, at 2091–93 (making doctrinal and statutory argument that
California should adopt color as Batson class).
448. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1976).
449. For a classic treatment of problems with the intent doctrine and a proposed solution, see
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355–58 (1987) (proposing a “‘cultural meaning’ test” to replace intent
requirement for equal protection claims). Given the current composition of the Supreme Court,
federal courts are highly unlikely to adopt Professor Lawrence’s proposed test. See infra text accompanying notes 459–462.
450. See supra note 3. Title VII disparate treatment claims also create such presumptions under
the McDonnell-Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–
03 (1973) (holding that plaintiffs can create a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and shift
burden to defendant to proffer non-discriminatory motive).
451. Understanding Implicit Bias, KIRWAN INST. FOR STUDY RACE AND ETHNICITY, http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understanding-implicit-bias/ (last visited May 11, 2020); see also
MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD
PEOPLE (2013). For a critique of implicit bias research, see Frederick L. Oswald et al., Predicting
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 171 (2013). For a broader critique of the focus on implicit bias to address
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have argued for incorporating implicit bias into equal protection doctrine and
other existing anti-discrimination frameworks. 452 Results from implicit bias
research have consistently shown that a majority of Americans associate
white and light skin with positive attributes and black and dark skin with
negative attributes. 453
As with color discrimination itself, juror selection is an area where the
law has begun to embrace implicit bias. In April 2017, the Washington Supreme Court adopted General Rule 37, 454 becoming the first American court
to address implicit bias in the selection of juries. 455 General Rule 37 states:
“If the court determines that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the peremptory
challenge shall be denied. The court need not find purposeful discrimination
to deny the peremptory challenge.” 456 The rule makes it clear that “an objective observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in
addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion
of potential jurors in Washington State.” 457
If implicit bias can be incorporated into civil rights law, the law cannot
only address unconscious forms of racism, but colorism-related research
might one day lead to additional legal protections against color discrimination. 458 It is also noteworthy that both the recognition of skin color discrimination and the acknowledgment of implicit bias in juror selection occurred

racial inequities, see JONATHAN KAHN, RACE ON THE BRAIN: WHAT IMPLICIT BIAS GETS WRONG
ABOUT THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (2017).
452. See, e.g., Alyson Grine & Emily Coward, Recognizing Implicit Bias Within the Equal Protection Framework, TRIAL BRIEFS, Apr. 2017, at 26. For example, one proposal has been to create
presumptions of motive based on statistical or circumstantial evidence: For racial profiling by police
officers, these may include statistical disparities in police stops. Id. But see McClesky v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistical evidence of racial disparities in application of capital
punishment did not demonstrate discriminatory motive).
453. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html (last visited
May 11, 2020). The most common test of implicit bias is the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”),
which involves pairing positive and negative words with characteristics such as race, skin color, and
gender. Id. One study of implicit bias found that “[c]olor . . . had a large, unambiguous effect that
was independent of race” and that “[t]he magnitude of the effect of race . . . depended primarily on
color. . . . darker skin magniﬁed the effect of race [and] exacerbated stereotypical beliefs.” Vesla
M. Weaver, The Electoral Consequences of Skin Color: The “Hidden” Side of Race in Politics, 34
POL. BEHAV. 159, 188 (2012).
454. WASH. GEN. R. 37.
455. See New Rule Addresses Failings of U.S. Supreme Court Decision, ACLU (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/news/washington-supreme-court-first-nation-adopt-rule-reduce-implicit-racial-bias-jury-selection.
456. WASH. GEN. R. 37(e).
457. WASH. GEN. R. 37(f).
458. Bennett & Plaut, supra note 440, at 800 (recommending that “judges, court staff, probation
officers, prosecutors, and defense lawyers . . . have the experience of taking an implicit association
test”). One of the authors, Mark W. Bennett, is himself a federal judge. Id. at 745.
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at the state level rather than in the federal courts. As the next Section lays
out, states are currently the best venues for these kinds of innovations in civil
rights law.
2. State Civil Rights Law
For several decades now, the United States Supreme Court has narrowed
the scope of civil rights protections for minority groups, seriously eroding the
notion of strict scrutiny articulated in Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene
Products. 459 The major trend in federal constitutional doctrine has been the
anticlassification view of equal protection. 460 Rooted in this view, the most
prominent recent equal protection cases have involved challenges to affirmative action programs which benefit racial minorities. 461 Given the current
composition of the Supreme Court, attempts to expand the scope of federal
protections against color discrimination would likely be futile for many years
to come. Nevertheless, Bridgeforth provides another lesson here—one about
the potential of state courts. Currently, state civil rights laws provide the
most promising vehicle for expanding legal protections against color discrimination. 462
Often, state laws have been an impediment to civil rights,463 but that is
not always the case. 464 In the current judicial climate, state governments provide the most promising venue for development of anti-discrimination law.
Forty years ago, with federal courts becoming increasingly conservative, Justice William Brennan famously called civil rights lawyers to look to state
459. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition . . . which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
460. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 268.
461. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
462. Like New York, many other state constitutions incorporate equal protection or other provisions that protect against color discrimination. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[N]or shall
any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or immunity; nor exempted from any burden or
duty, on account of race [or] color . . . .”); CONN. CONST. art I, § 20 (“No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, [or] color . . . .”); MA. CONST.
pt. I, art. I (“Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed
or national origin.”); MT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against
any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race [or] color . . . .”); N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person
be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race [or] color . . . .”); TX. CONST art. I, § 3a
(“Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.”); WY. CONST art. I, § 3 (“Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights
is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and
privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race [or] color . . . .”).
463. See Jeff Nilsson, The Civil Rights Act vs. States’ Rights, SATURDAY EVENING POST (July
2, 2014), https://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2014/07/the-civil-rights-act-vs-states-rights/.
464. See, e.g., infra notes 467–468.
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constitutions for future pursuit of individual rights. 465 State constitutions
have been “a rich source of protection for equality.” 466 School finance litigation under state constitutions has been quite successful,467 and most recently, same-sex marriage rights also developed under state constitutional
rulings, 468 which influenced other states and then eventually the federal
courts to guarantee the same rights. 469 Through a process of strategic litigation and lobbying, color-based anti-discrimination law could be another area
where “courageous [s]tate[s] may . . . serve as . . . laborator[ies]; and try
novel social and economic experiments” 470 in the pursuit of equality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the changing relationship between race and
color in civil rights law. The term “color” has at times actually denoted race

465. Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in
School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301 (2011); Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011); William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); see also Katie
Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1342-68 (2018); Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999) (discussing standards of review that state courts should apply in assessing whether state constitutional obligations are being met); Sanford Levinson, America’s
“Other Constitutions”: The Importance of State Constitutions for Our Law and Politics, 45 TULSA
L. REV. 813 (2010); Hon. Jenny Rivera, State High Courts and Individual Rights: The New York
State Court of Appeals Recent Jurisprudence, From Skin-Color Based Peremptory Challenges to
the Right of Sepulcher, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 1107 (2018); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013 (2003); Vinay Harpalani, Note, Maintaining
Educational Adequacy in Times of Recession: Judicial Review of State Education Budgets, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 258 (2010).
466. Shaman, supra note 465, at 1018.
467. See MICHAEL REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH
THE STATE COURTS (2009).
468. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding prohibitions on samesex marriage to violate the Iowa Constitution). For other state court rulings with similar holdings,
see Eyer, supra note 465, at 1344 n.126. Also, Mary Bonauto and James Esseks discuss how in
strategizing the legal effort to strike down bans on same-sex marriage, they began by bringing state
constitutional cases:
[W]e wanted the focus to be on the State’s decisions about how to treat people. . . . We
also did not want to federalize the issue at that time but instead to break through the
historic barriers, get to a win and hold it, and . . . . develop a patchwork where some states
allowed marriage, even as others didn’t, and get to a point where we could ask for a
national resolution.
Mary Bonauto & James Esseks, Marriage Equality Advocacy from the Trenches, 29 COLUM. J. OF
GENDER & L. 117, 120 (2015).
469. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding prohibitions on same-sex marriage to violate the U.S. Constitution).
470. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Louis Brandeis’s opinion in Liebmann laid out the idea of states as “laboratories” of experimentation for social policy. Id.
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and at other times referred directly to skin color.471 This ambiguity was apparent in the antebellum era and Reconstruction Era laws, 472 and in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.473 Although it was known and undisputed that skin color did not always determine race, judges and others often gave heavy weight to skin color when identifying an individual’s race. 474
In particular, those with relatively dark skin were presumed to be Black. 475
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court
recognized both race and color discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, but it did not differentiate between the two. 476 Skin color was often
presumed to be the means to identify race, but no separate jurisprudence developed around color discrimination. 477 Gradually, use of “color” became
much less common in the Supreme Court’s equal protection opinions: Often
the term was used just when quoting prior cases. 478
Nevertheless, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, color
discrimination re-emerged under Title VII of that act and under other civil
rights statutes. 479 Under these statutes, courts distinguished between race and
color discrimination, with the later referring specifically to skin color bias
independent of race. 480 Color discrimination cases brought under these statutes typically involved a single plaintiff of one race-color subclass: for example, a dark-skinned African American.
People v. Bridgeforth added a novel dimension to “color” discrimination jurisprudence. 481 For the first time, a court recognized a multiracial color
class, made up of individuals of different races linked solely by their dark
skin color. 482 Bridgeforth was limited to New York’s Equal Protection
Clause and Section 13 of New York’s Civil Rights Law, 483 but it opens up
possibilities for future developments in color discrimination law. 484

471. See supra Part I.
472. See supra Part II.
473. See supra Part III.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 105, 118; see also United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101,
102 (5th Cir. 1910) (holding that Petitioner Abba Dolla was White because the “skin of [Dolla’s]
arm . . . was sufficiently transparent for the blue color of the veins to show very clearly”).
475. See supra text accompanying note 105.
476. See supra Part III.
477. See supra Part III.
478. See supra Part IV.
479. See supra Part V.
480. See supra Part V.
481. 69 N.E.3d 611 (N.Y. 2016).
482. Id.; see supra Part VI.D.
483. See supra Part VI.D.
484. See supra Part VII.
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As American racism becomes more complex and intersects even more
with colorism, multiracial color classes will become more relevant and important for civil rights law. 485 Civil rights advocates will need to collect data
on skin color discrimination and employ creative legal strategies to address
it. 486 In the broader scope, this can move American civil rights law in a more
progressive direction. A century and a half after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, “color” itself may help to change the “colorblind” ideology 487 that has stifled civil rights law in America.

485. See supra Part VII.A–B.
486. See supra Part VII.D.
487. See supra text accompanying note 268.

